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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is the second appeal concerning multiple award contracts issued by the Idaho
Department of Administration ("DOA") to Qwest Communications Company, LLC ("Qwest")
and ENA Services, LLC ("ENA") for construction, operation and maintenance of the Idaho
Education Network ("IEN''). This Court held, in Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department of
Administration, 305 P.3d 499, 502 (Idaho 2013) ("Syringa !'), that Syringa Networks, LLC

("Syringa") was injured by DOA's actions in issuing amendments ("Amendments No. 1") that
split otherwise identical and lawful multiple award contracts into separate contracts for dissimilar
services in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A. The District Court held,
following remand, that the IEN contracts, as amended by Amendments No. 1, ("IEN Contracts,
as Amended") do not conform to the IEN Request for Proposals ("RFP") description of the
property to be acquired, violate Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A, and are void. DOA,
Qwest and ENA have appealed that determination.
Neither DOA, Qwest, nor ENA make any effort to demonstrate that Amendments No. 1
were lawful. DOA and Qwest contend, instead, that the District Court misinterpreted Syringa I
and went too far by holding that the IEN contracts, as amended are void. According to DOA and
Qwest, Syringa I required only that Amendments No. 1 be stricken. ENA separately contends
that it was erroneously brought back into the litigation after remand and that the District Court
was powerless to invalidate any part of its IEN contract. None of the Appellants' positions can
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be reconciled with the fundamental principal of Syringa I that the unlawful nature of DOA's
actions fatally tainted the IEN competitive bidding process.
This Court held in Syringa I that Syringa was injured by, and has standing to redress, the
violation of the violations of Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(2) and 67-5718A that destroyed its ability
to fairly compete in the IEN competitive bidding process.
Syringa has alleged a distinct and palpable injury, not suffered by
all Idaho citizens, that is alleged to have been caused by the
challenged conduct and that can be redressed by judicial relief. The
record indicates that had the RFP solicited bids for separate
contracts that described the property to be acquired in accordance
with the amended contracts ultimately awarded, Syringa would
have bid to perform the work specified in the amended contract
awarded to Qwest. Syringa submitted a bid to ENA to perform that
same work. Therefore, Syringa has standing to challenge the
amended contract to Qwest because it constituted, in effect,
changing the RFP after the bids were opened.

Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506.
DOA, Qwest, and ENA advance carefully compartmented arguments in an attempt to
avoid the judicial redress available under Syringa I. But these arguments are to no avail because
the District Court's determination that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, violate Idaho Code §§
67-5718(2) and 67-5718A and are void is the only redress available to Syringa under the law. As
a result of the District Court's judgment, Syringa and other potential providers of services
required by the IEN have had the opportunity to fairly compete in new IEN and state agency
broadband procurements that comply with the law. See, e.g., Senate Bill No. 1175 passed as part
of the 2015 Session Laws, Chapter 346. No other result could provide this redress for the injury
sustained by S yringa and identified by this Court.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 2
3438924_8 [5821-112]

B.

Statement of Facts
1.

The IEN RFP, the Awards, the Contracts and Amendments No. 1

The IEN was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance
learning for public schools, libraries and state agencies. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 502. The DOA
was given administrative oversight of the IEN, including "[p]rocur[ing] telecommunications
services and equipment for the IEN through an open and competitive bidding process." Id.
(brackets in original). That process involved, among other things, the publication of the IEN
RFP that described the services sought and the requirements for bidding. Id.
In spite of its name, the IEN RFP was not solely about education. Part of the IEN project
was to provide services to schools and libraries and was designed to qualify for federal E-Rate
funding. The other part of the system was to serve state agencies, was intended to replace "aging
Idanet equipment and services," and was not designed to be subsidized by E-rate funding. (R. p.
1788.) Detail concerning the state agencies involved in the IEN project was added to the IEN
RFP by Amendment 03 on December 29, 2008. These agencies and locations were identified in
the seven pages of Appendix F added to the IEN RFP by Amendment 03. (Exhibits to
Augmented R., Ex. D to the March 19, 2010 Affidavit of Mark Little ("Little Affidavit"). 1)
Notwithstanding the extensive scope of the project, the IEN RFP sought "proposals from
bidders who were able to perform the entire contract which, under the wording of the RFP,

1 The

Augmented Record cited herein refers to the record of the prior appeal in this case (No. 38735). This
Court entered an Order Augmenting Appeals on June 2, 2015, which ordered that the appeal record in this
consolidated appeal be augmented to include the Court File, Clerk's Record, and Reporter's Transcripts filed in the
prior appeal.
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would be a 'total end-to-end service support solution."' Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505 (emphasis
added). Toward that end, the RFP encouraged partnerships and directed vendors not to bid on a
"particular section of the RFP":
As stated in the RFP, the State desires to partner with a total
service solution provider. Vendors interested in bidding on a
particular section of the RFP, are highly encouraged to work with a
major service provider partner or partners, in an effort to meet all
of the required specifications as set forth in this document.
(Exhibits to Augmented R., Ex. E to Little Affidavit, RFP "A-15" (emphasis in original)); see
also Syringa L 305 P.3d at 503-05.

Because it was prohibited from submitting a bid solely on broadband services, Syringa
entered into a Teaming Agreement with ENA under which it provided pricing and technical
information that was used in ENA' s response to the IEN RFP. If the RFP had allowed vendors
to bid on specific sections, Syringa could have bid on the broadband section of the RFP and
would not have needed to team with ENA. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506.
Upon receiving the evaluation scores that showed Qwest in second place behind ENA,
DOA announced it would make a multiple award under Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. Id., 305 P.3d
at 503.

Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 2009, DOA issued identical Statewide Blanket

Purchase Orders ("SBPOs") for same or similar services to Qwest and to ENA. SBPO 1308 was
issued to Qwest and SBPO 1309 was issued to ENA. These multiple award contracts allowed
competition between Qwest and ENA to provide all the services described in the RFP as required
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by Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. 2 Id.
Amendments No. 1 were issued 29 days later on February 26, 2009. These amendments
were documented by Change Order-01 and titled "Amendment One (1)" to the Qwest and ENA
SBPOs. (Exhibits to Augmented R., Exs. K and L to Little Affidavit); see also Syringa I, 305
P.3d at 503. State Purchasing Manager Mark Little testified that Amendments No. 1 "further
defined" the "scope of work" for Qwest SBPO 1308 and for ENA SBPO 1309. (R. pp. 728729.)
The further definition of the scope of work contained in Amendments No. 1 split the IEN
project into two contracts for dissimilar property and services and eliminated the competition
between Qwest and ENA that was created by the original IEN contracts. Amendment No. 1 to
Qwest SBPO 1308 assigned "technical network services" and all "internet services" exclusively
to Qwest:
1.

Qwest will be the general contractor for all IEN technical
network services. The service provider listed on the State's
Federal E-Rate form 471, Education Networks of America
(ENA) is required to work with the dedicated Qwest
Account Team for ordering, and provisioning of, on-going
maintenance, operations and billing for all lEN sites.

***
4.

Qwest, in coordination with ENA, will provide all Internet
services to IEN users.

2

DOA acknowledges this fact in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification on which it states, "SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309 are identical awards authorizing the state to select any
service covered by the Idaho Education Network ('IEN') Request for Proposals ('RFP'), which also includes the
wide area network used by the state agencies, from either Qwest or ENA." (R. p. 1660.)
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(Exhibits to Augmented R., Ex. K to Little Affidavit (emphasis added).)
Amendment No. 1 to ENA SBPO 1309 designated ENA as the federal E-Rate provider,
was consistent with the assignment of all IEN technical network services and internet services to
Qwest, and assigned separate tasks to ENA that were not assigned to Qwest. (Exhibits to
Augmented R., Ex. L to Little Affidavit.)
Amendments No. 1 prohibited ENA from obtaining broadband services from any
provider other than Qwest without the consent of Qwest.

(R. p. 1524 (Deposition of Greg

Zichau, p. 290, 1. 12 - 291, 1. 21).) The designation of Qwest as the general contractor for all
IEN technical network services also made Qwest the exclusive provider of broadband services to
state agencies. (R. pp. 1788, 1793-1794.)
Finally, both Amendments No. 1 acknowledged the elimination of multiple award
competition by identifying Qwest and ENA as "equal partners" in identically worded paragraphs
8 to each Amendment No. 1. (Exhibits to Augmented R., Exs. K and L to Little Affidavit.)
Confronted with the post-award amendment, and the resulting loss of competition, this
Court concluded that DOA apparently "believed that the statute [Idaho Code § 67-5718A(l)]
only controlled the initial award to multiple bidders" and that Amendments No. 1 would not be
subject to the requirements of the statute. This Court then explained:
A government agency may not do indirectly what it is prevented
by law from doing directly. See O 'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls, 78
Idaho 313, 325, 303 P.2d 672, 678 (1956) ("What cannot be done
directly by the City of Idaho Falls because of constitutional
limitations cannot be accomplished indirectly."). If the State could
circumvent the statute simply by amending the contracts awarded
to multiple bidders, then the statute would be of no effect. That
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two-step approach is obviously not permissible when considered
in light of subsection (3) of the statute, which states, "\Vhere a
contract for property has been awarded to two (2) or more bidders
in accordance with this section, a state agency shall make
purchases from the contractor whose terms and conditions
regarding price, availability, support services and delivery are most
adva11tageous to the agency." I.C. § 67-5718A(3). Subsection (3)
obviously intends, for the benefit of the taxpayers, that the
multiple bidders who are awarded contracts will remain as
competitors, which will only occur if they are furnishing the same
or similar property.
Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 505 (emphasis added).

Qwest and ENA protest that they never signed Amendments No. 1.

While true,

Amendments No. 1 were nonetheless accepted by Qwest and ENA, who performed and were
paid millions of dollars in accordance with their terms for more than five years. Qwest and ENA
also adopted and ratified Amendments No. 1 in subsequent amendments to the IEN SBPOs.
2.

Qwest and ENA Incorporate and Ratify Amendments No. 1 Via Subsequent
Amendments to the JEN Contracts

Qwest SBPO 1308 and ENA SBPO 1309 were each amended several times after the
February 26, 2009 Amendments No. 1. The Qwest SBPO was amended multiple times and
extended by amendment in 2013 to 2019. (R. pp. 557-724.) The ENA SBPO was also extended
by amendment in 2013 to 2019. (R. pp. 725-854.) Each of these subsequent amendments was
signed by the parties.

Notably, the subsequent amendments also referred to and ratified

Amendments No. 1 that were not signed by Qwest and ENA.
Amendment No. 12 to Qwest SBPO 1308 recited, incorporated and ratified the unsigned
Amendment No. 1 on March 25, 2013, as follows:
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RECITALS

The Department of Administration Division of Purchasing
("Purchasing") issued a request for proposals for services related to
the development of an educational network for the State of Idaho
as RFP 02160.
A.

B.
Purchasing awarded to CenturyLink a contract under the
above request for proposals, which resulted in Agreement
SBP01308. SBPO 1308 was amended pursuant to SBP01308-0l,
SBP01308-02, SBP01308-03, SBP01308-04, SBP01308-05,
SBP01308-06, SBP01308-07, SBP01308-08, SBP01308-09,
SBP01308-I0, and SBP01308-1 l.

C.
The parties desire to further amend SBPO 1308 as set forth
in this Amendment Twelve.
AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, which
are incorporated herein by this reference, and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows ...

(R. p. 565 (emphasis added).)
Amendment Two (2) to ENA SBPO 1309 was executed on January 18, 2013, extended
the term ofENA's contract to 2019 and recited and incorporated Amendment No. 1 as follows:
RECITALS

A.
Purchasing issued a request for proposals for services
related to the development of an educational network for the State
of Idaho as RFP 02160 (the "RFP") on behalf of the office of the
Chief Information Officer ("OCIO").
B.

ENA submitted a proposal in response to the RFP.

C.
Following an evaluation of the proposals, Purchasing
selected ENA to perform certain services set forth in the RFP,
which resulted in a contract memorialized in State Blanket
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Purchase order number 1309 (SBP01309). SBP001309 was
amended pursuant to State Blanket Purchase Order number 130901 (SBP01309-01) and the attachment to SBP01309-01 captioned
"Idaho Division of Purchasing Amendment One (1) to State of
Idaho Education Network (IEN)" SBP01309-01 and its attachment
are herein referred to as the "First Amendment".

***
AGREEMENT

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, which
are incorporated herein by this reference, and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which 1s
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:
(R. p. 728 (emphasis added).)
These amendments were followed in 2014 by further amendments designed to avoid the
impact of Syringa I.
3.

Performance Under the IEN Contracts, as Amended.

Performance under the IEN Contracts, as Amended, involved the provision of technical
network services and internet services to Idaho schools and state agencies. Qwest either
provided, or was the gatekeeper for all these services. Providers other than Qwest could be used
only if Qwest consented. (R. p. 1522-1524 (Deposition of Greg Zichau, p. 280, 1. 24 - p. 286, 1.
6; p. 290, 1. 12 -p. 291, 1. 21).)
Even though ENA was the service provider listed on the State's federal E-Rate form 471,
ENA could not directly contract with Syringa or any provider other than Qwest for IEN
telecommunication services. This limitation became an economic problem for Idaho schools
because ENA could not provide reasonably priced IEN services to school districts outside areas
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that were routinely served by Qwest. As a result, several school districts in areas of the state that
were poorly served by Qwest did not initially receive IEN services.

The DOA identified

33 locations by January, 2010 whose cost of service, if commenced, would exceed 150% of the
established IEN reasonable cost per Mbps. DO,A~ personnel called these locations "Intervention
Schools" and placed their IEN connections on indefinite hold. (R. pp. 1337-1238 (Third Aff. of
Brady Kraft at ,r,r 8-11).)
Although several different solutions to the problem of the Intervention Schools were
considered, the most economical solution required Syringa to participate. Requests that Syringa
agree to provide IEN connectivity to the IEN high cost areas were made by Qwest and ENA at
the direction of Brady Kraft. (R. pp. 861-854 (Aff. of Brady Kraft at ,r,r 18-27); R. pp. 1129-1130
(Aff. of Greg Zichau at ,r,r 67-70).)
The problem of the Intervention Schools was resolved in mid-2011 when Syringa agreed,
at the request of Jim Schmidt, President of Qwest, to enter into a limited Service Agreement to
provide service to Qwest. (R. pp. 1130-1131 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at ff 69-74); R. pp. 1323-1355
(Service Agreement).) The Intervention Schools were then brought online with the IEN.
DOA contends that "Syringa hedged its bets" by entering into the Service Agreement
with Qwest that allowed IEN service to be delivered economically to the Intervention Schools.
(DOA Opening Brief at 5.) While it is true that Syringa was paid for providing service to allow
Qwest to complete IEN connectivity, it is not true that Syringa was "hedging its bets." The
economical service provided to the Intervention Schools as a result of Syringa's participation
could have been provided sooner and without any Qwest general contractor mark-up under the
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original IEN contracts.

The original IEN contracts would have allowed ENA to select any

technical network services provider and to compete with Qwest to provide services to the
Intervention Schools under Idaho Code § 67-5718A.

ENA was, however, prohibited by

A1nendments No. 1 from competing with Qwest and from using any technicai network services

provider other than Qwest without the consent of Qwest. Amendments No. 1, in other words,
created the problem of the Intervention Schools.

4.

Existing State Agency Broadband Contracts Are Overridden and Replaced
by the IEN Contracts, as Amended.

DOA Director J. Michael Gwartney announced in June, 2009 that state agencies
contracting with service providers other than Qwest would be "migrated" to Qwest. The result
of this move was that existing state agency contracts with providers other than Qwest were
repudiated by DOA. (R. p. 1788; R. pp. 1793-1794 (Deposition of Greg Zickau, p. 367, I. 6 - p.
368, 1. 17).)
Qwest provided services to state agencies pursuant to the IEN Contracts, as Amended
commencing in 2009. By 2014, Qwest was billing approximately $160,000 per month "for
services ordered against SBP01308 and provided to state agencies." (R. p. 1197 (Aff. of Joel
Strickler at ,r 6).) Qwest billed additional amounts separately to ENA under the IEN Contracts,
as Amended, for services provided to the IEN through ENA. (R. pp. 1197 (Aff. of Joel Strickler
at ,r 5).)

5.

DOA, Qwest, and ENA Try to Rescind Amendments No. 1 to Moot this Case
After Syringa I.

This Court issued its opinion in Syringa I on March 29, 2013.

In that opinion, it
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concluded that changes to the respective IEN scopes of work for Qwest and ENA effected by
Amendments No. 1 violated the law:
An RFP is required to "describe the property to be acquired in
sufficient detail to apprise a bidder of the exact nature or
functionality of the property required." I.C. § 67-5718(2). A
"request for proposals may be changed by the buyer through
issuance of an addendum, provided the change is issued in writing
prior to the bid opening date and is made available to all vendors
receiving the original solicitation." IDAPA 38.05.01.052. By
amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect,
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of
I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052. The separate
contracts as amended no longer conform to the RFP's description
of the property to be acquired. The description of property to be
provided by Qwest under its amended contract is not a minor
deviation from the property to be provided by the successful bidder
under the RFP, nor is the property to be provided by ENA under its
amended contract. "[M]ere schemes to evade law, once their true
character is established, are impotent for the purpose intended.
Courts sweep them aside as so much rubbish." O'Bryant, 78 Idaho
at 325, 303 P.2d at 678.

Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the decision of this Court, DOA, Qwest, and ENA continued to operate
under the IEN Contracts, as Amended, without any change that appears in the record until July,
2014. At that time, apparently in preparation to filing a motion for summary judgment against
Syringa's challenge to the IEN contracts, DOA entered into new amendments (the "Rescission
Amendments") to the IEN SBPOs with Qwest and ENA. (R. pp. 1457-1461.)
The Rescission Amendments purported to rescind Amendments No. 1 and to repudiate
the incorporation and ratification of Amendments No. 1 that occurred in subsequent
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amendments.

The Rescission Amendment to Qwest SBPO 1308 contained no language of

explanation. (R. pp. 1460-1461.) The Rescission Amendment to ENA SBPO 1309, on the other
hand, contained the following explanation as a Recital:
Neither the State nor ENA intended Amendment No. 1 to alter the
services available from ENA under SBPO 1309. Non-parties to
SBPO 1309 have misconstrued Amendment No. 1 to mean it
altered the services ENA was eligible to provide under SBPO
1309. To avoid any confusion or misperception about Amendment
No. 1, the State and ENA are hereby confirming their
understanding that Amendment No. 1 did not alter the services
ENA was eligible to provide under SBPO 1309. Moreover,
because Amendment No. 1 did not alter the rights and obligations
of the parties to SBPO 1309, the State and ENA are hereby
rescinding Amendment No. 1 to clarify that it had no effect on
SBPO 1309.
(R. p. 1457.) Although the wording of the Rescission Amendments is not identical, the meaning
of the words used is clear and consistent. Paragraph 2 of the Qwest Rescission Amendment
states:
The Parties agree that Amendment No. 1, together with any
language included in any amendments to SBPO 1308 incorporating
by reference said Amendment No. 1, is and are hereby rescinded
by the State, superseded and of no force or effect upon SBPO
1308.
(R. p. 1460.) Paragraph 2 of the ENA Rescission Amendment states the same thing in a slightly
different way:
Amendment No. 1, together with any language included in the
subsequent amendments to SBPO 1309 incorporating by reference
said Amendment No. 1, is and are hereby rescinded ab initio,
superseded and of no force or effect upon SBPO 1308.
(R. p. 1458.)
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The record reflects no change in the conduct or performance of DOA, Qwest, or ENA as
a result of the execution of the Rescission Amendments. The record also reflects no attempt by
DOA, Qwest, or ENA to acknowledge the unlawful nature of the Amendments No. 1, or to repay
the tens of millions of dollars paid while Amendments No. 1 were in effect.

C.

Course of Proceedings Below
Syringa I was released by this Court on March 29, 2013. Syringa and DOA each filed

Petitions for Rehearing. DOA's petition for rehearing raised two issues relevant to this appeal.
First, DOA asked the Court to revisit and reverse its holding that Syringa had standing to assert
Count Three of its Complaint. Second, DOA asked that the Court issue a substitute opinion
concerning Syringa's standing that did not address the substantive issue of whether Idaho Code
§ 67-5718A was violated.

In its Petition, DOA contended that the question whether

Amendments No. 1 violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A was not before the Court on appeal. (See
Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013.)
DOA's petition for rehearing was denied. (See Idaho Supreme Court Order dated July 11, 2013,
p. 1.)

After remand, Syringa filed a Rule 60(b)(6) and 15(a) Motion to Amend Complaint
concerning its claims against J. Michael "Mike" Gwartney and Jack G. "Greg" Zickau, and a
Motion to Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 of its complaint after remand. The
District Court issued a decision denying Syringa's 60(b)(6) motion and granting its Motion to
Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 on February 25, 2014. (R. pp. 50-60.) The
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amended Count Three and amended Paragraph 94 of Syringa's Complaint added a challenge to
the ENA SBPO, as amended, and alleged that the original IEN SBPOs were a pretext and the
first step in the unlawful two-step approach undertaken by DOA. (R. pp. 61-81.)
Syringa filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 20, 2014 asking the
District Court to declare that SBPOs 1308 and 1309 violate provisions of Title 67, Chapter 57 of
the Idaho Code and are void by operation ofidaho Code§ 67-5725. (R. pp. 526-528.) Syringa's
motion was supported, among other things, by the then current statewide blanket purchase order
SBPO 1308 issued to Qwest and the then current statewide blanket purchase order SBPO 1309
issued to ENA. (R. pp. 554-854.) Syringa further supported its motion by a memorandum and
extensive citations to the record. (R. pp. 529-535.)

Syringa served its Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment and other pleadings that had inadvertently not been served on Qwest and
ENA on both on April 25, 2014. (See Ex. 1 to the Affidavit of Melodie A. McQuade in Support
of Syringa Networks, LLC's Motion to Augment the Record ("McQuade Affidavit"). 3)
The hearing on Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was postponed after
DOA filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 22, 2014 that asked the District Court to
reconsider its decision allowing Syringa to amend Count Three. DOA contended, among other
things, that this Court's statements regarding DOA's unlawful conduct in Syringa I were merely

3 Syringa filed a Motion to Augment the Record with this Court on December 7, 2015 that was supported
by the McQuade Affidavit.
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dicta, and that this Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by commenting on the merits of
Count Three. 4 (See Ex. 2 to McQuade Affidavit.)
The District Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider
on June 24, 2014 ("Amendment Reconsideration Decision") in which it rejected DOA's
contention that this Court's statements regarding the Amendments' illegality were dicta, and
rejecting DOA's arguments that this Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction. (R. pp. 13901405.) In reaching that conclusion, the District Court cited Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson,
302 P.3d 18, 23 (Idaho 2013) and stated:
In deciding that Syringa had standing to challenge to the amended
SBPO to Qwest, the Supreme Court stated a principle of law that
was necessary to its decision, i.e. that by improperly splitting the
IEN RFP scope of work between ENA and Qwest, DOA caused a
distinct and palpable injury to Syringa, who otherwise would have
submitted a bid for the work later awarded solely to Qwest. The
Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is not
dicta. The Court's determination that the amendment violated state
law is the law of this case and will be adhered to by this Court.
(R. p. 1398.) The District Court did, however, reconsider and reverse its previous decision
allowing Syringa to challenge the original SBPOs as "unlawful pretext to divide the scope of
work between Qwest and ENA" on the basis that Syringa was judicially estopped from making
that claim. (R. pp. 1399-1402.) The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration
concerning its decision allowing the amendment of paragraph 94 of Syringa's Complaint to
assert that both Amendments No. 1 were issued in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and
67-5718. (R. pp. 1397-1399.)

4

DOA made a similar argument in its Petition for Rehearing that was rejected by this Court.
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The Amendment Reconsideration Decision also addressed the requirement of Idaho Code
§ 10-1211 that "all persons ... be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be

affected by the declaration" in actions for declaratory judgment, and concluded that Syringa's
challenge to Amendments No. 1 required the presence of ENA and Qwest as necessary parties.
Qwest, according to the District Court, remained a party following the remand of Count Three.
(R. p. 1403.) ENA, on the other hand, had been dismissed, according to the Court, and was

required to be added as a party. The District Court therefore ordered that ENA be made a party
and that a copy of the Amended Complaint be served upon ENA and Qwest. (R. pp. 14031404.)
Syringa obtained the issuance of a summons for a Second Amended Post-Appeal
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in response to the District Court's order. Syringa added
the following notice and reservation of rights to that summons:
The Plaintiff obtained issuance of this Summons Concerning The
Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and Demand For Jury
Trial to comply with the June 24, 2014 Memorandum Decision
And Order Re Motion To Reconsider entered by the above court.
Plaintiff does not admit, by obtaining issuance of this summons,
that ENA Services, LLC is no longer a party to this case following
remittitur by the Idaho Supreme Court on August 29, 2013 or that
service of process is necessary to reestablish jurisdiction over ENA
Services, LLC.
Plaintiff further reserves all other remedies that may be available to
it in connection with the Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint
And Demand For Jury Trial including, but not limited to, those
remedies that may be available to it under Rule 60 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(See Ex. 3 to McQuade Affidavit.) Plaintiffs Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, together with the Summons for Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial were served upon ENA on July 3, 2014. (See Ex. 4 to McQuade
Affidavit.) ENA then filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R. pp. 1434-1447.)
DOA filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment on August 11, 2014, asserting, among
other things, that the Rescission Amendments mooted the case. (R. pp. 1448-1450, 1462-1479.)
Qwest joined in DOA's motion. (R. pp. 1572-1574.)
Syringa served an Amended Notice of Hearing on August 22, 2014 advising the parties
that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be heard on October 10, 2014. Syringa's
Notice stated that the scope of Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would be
limited, pursuant to the court's June 24, 2014 Memorandum Decision and Order Re Motion To
Reconsider, to a determination of whether SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309, as amended by
Amendments No. 1 violate provisions of Title 67, Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code and are void by
operation of Idaho Code § 67-5725. (See Ex. 5 to McQuade Affidavit.) DOA noticed its cross
Motion for Summary Judgment at the same time. (See Ex. 6 to McQuade Affidavit.)
The District Court heard arguments on ENA's Motion to Dismiss and on the DOA,
Qwest and Syringa cross-motions for summary judgment on October 10, 2014. Counsel for
ENA appeared with counsel for DOA and Qwest and argued in opposition to Syringa's motion.
(Tr., p. 66, L. 21 -p. 69, L. 6.)
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order RE Pending Dispositive
Motions on November 10, 2014 ("Dispositive Decision"). (R. pp. 1638-1653.) In that decision,
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the District Court noted that Quiring vs. Quiring, 944 P .2d 695 (Idaho 1997) places an
affirmative duty on Idaho courts to raise the issue of illegality of a contract at any stage in the
litigation without regard to whether the issue was pleaded by a party:
The Court is not free to ignore this issue or to countenance the
continuation of contracts that resulted from violation from state
procurement law. The award of the SBPO to ENA, when amended
to divide the scope of work, violated state procurement law, and is
void. ENA' s motion to dismiss this claim is denied. ENA is
seeking a ruling that would allow ENA to benefit from an
improper award. In the Court's view, such a result would fly in the
face of the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
The Supreme Court decided this case in March, 2013. Since then,
DOA has argued that the Supreme Court had no authority to decide
that DOA's actions violated procurement law. DOA also argued
that the Supreme Court's ruling that DOA violated state
procurement law was improper dicta which this Court is free to
ignore. The Supreme Court's ruling that DOA violated state
procurement law by splitting work between Qwest and ENA is the
law of the case, and is binding on the parties and this Court. The
awards which divided the work violate state procurement law and
are void.
(R. p. 1649.)
DOA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the court's November 10,
2014 Order on November 18, 2014. (R. pp. 1654-1657.) Qwest filed a Motion for Clarification
and/or Reconsideration on November 24, 2014 (R. pp. 1687-1691), and ENA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on December 8, 2014. (R. pp. 1712-1714.) The motions were all taken under
advisement by the District Court without oral argument.
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions to Reconsider
on February 11, 2015 ("Reconsideration Decision"). (R. pp. 2016-2037.) In the Reconsideration
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Decision, the District Court rejected each and every contention asserted by the Defendants;
clarified that its order applied to both SBPOs, in their entirety; concluded that its obligation to
apply Idaho Code § 67-5725 was fulfilled by a determination that the contracts are void; and
reiterated that it has a duty, under Quiring vs. Quiring, to address ihe iilegality of the IEN
procurement. (R. pp. 2016-2037.)
At the same time that DOA, ENA, and Qwest had moved for reconsideration of the
Dispositive Decision, Syringa submitted a proposed form of judgment that contained two
relevant provisions drawn from Idaho Code § 67-5725. (R. pp. 2067-2068). The first element
was that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, are void. The second element directed DOA, through
the Administrator of the Division of Purchasing, to make a demand for repayment contemplated
by the following provision of Idaho Code§ 67-5725:
All contracts or agreements made in violation of the provisions of
this chapter shall be void and any sum of money advanced by the
state of Idaho in consideration of any such contract or agreement
shall be repaid forthwith. In the event of refusal or delay when
repayment is demanded by the proper officer of the state of Idaho,
under whose authority such contract or agreement shall have been
made or entered into, every person so refusing or delaying,
together with his surety or sureties, shall be forthwith prosecuted at
law for the recovery of such sum of money so advanced.
LC. § 67-5725 (emphasis added).
The court entered judgment on February 11, 2015 as follows (the "Judgment"):
Statewide Blanket Purchase Order 1308 to Qwest
Communications, LLC, as amended by Amendment One, is void.
1.

2.
Statewide Blanket Purchase Order 1309 to ENA Services,
LLC, as ai1Uended by Amended One, is void.
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(R. p. 2038.)

The Judgment was directed soleiy to the IEN Contracts, as Amended.

The

Judgment did not include any relief against Qwest or ENA because Syringa made no claim in
Count Three against Qwest or ENA. The Judgment also did not contain the provision requested
by Syringa pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5725 that is the subject of Syringa's cross appeal.

II.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Syringa is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code
§§ 12-120(3), 12-120, 12-117, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

III.

ARGUMENT

DOA, Qwest and ENA assert multiple issues on appeal.

Syringa's analysis of the

standard of review and response to each of Appellants' issues appear below.
A.

Standard of Review

Appellants' briefs accurately describe some standards of review, but omit four standards
relevant to this appeal.

(DOA Opening Brief at 16-17; Qwest Opening Brief at 11; ENA

Opening Brief at 13-15.)
First, this Court "exercises free review on issues of law," including whether an issue
decided in a prior appeal is law of the case. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 153 P .3d
1158, 1161 (Idaho 2007).
Second, this Court "reviews a District Court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
amend for abuse of discretion." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 331 P .3d 491, 495
(Idaho 2014). "A court should liberally grant a motion to amend a complaint." Id. at 497
(citation omitted).
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Third, this Court "has the duty to raise the issue of [contract] illegality sua sponte" even
if the issue was not presented below or by the parties. Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc. v. Flying Joseph

Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136, 1139-40 (Idaho 2011) (citation omitted); Taylor v. AJA Servs.
Carp., 261 P.3d 829,841 (Idaho 2011) (citation omitted) (the Court "does not concern itself as to
the manner in which the illegality of a contract before it was brought to its attention"). "Whether
a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of each case." Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P .3d at 1139-40 (citing Trees v. Kersey,
56 P.3d 765, 768 (Idaho 2002)).
Fourth, "it is well-settled that where an order of a lower court is correct, but based on an
erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory."

Grabicki v. City of

Lewiston, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (Idaho 2013) (citation omitted). This Court "will uphold the decision
of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be found to support it." Daleiden v. Jefferson

Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071-72 (Idaho 2003) (citation omitted).
B.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Rule on the Legality of the Amended SBPOs.
1.

The Requirements of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act Were
Satisfied.
a.

ENA and Qwest Were Not Required to Be Objects of a Claim for
Relief.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA") provides that "[w ]hen declaratory
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to
the proceeding." LC. § 10-1211; see Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 108 P.3d
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340, 344-45 (Idaho 2005); Tomehak v. Walker, 700 P.2d 68, 71 (Idaho 1985). UDJA does not,
however, require plaintiffs to name all necessary and interested parties as defendants in the
specific declaratory judgment count of a complaint. UDJA requires that only that all interested
persons be made parties to the proceeding before any deciaraiion is entered that couid prejudice
their interest. This rule is rooted in principles of due process:
The rule that a court will not render a declaratory judgment unless
all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint
are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof is not
merely a procedural regulation but, rather, is in recognition and
implementation of the basic principle that due process of law
requires that the rights of no person may be judicially determined
without affording him or her a day in court and an opportunity to
be heard.
22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 204, Necessity of Making All Interested Persons
Parties, Observation (2d Ed. 2014). Qwest and ENA were interested and necessary parties under
UDJA because their interests could be affected by entry of the declaratory judgment sought by
Syringa in Count Three. Qwest and ENA were not, however, the object of a claim for relief by
Syringa and not defendants in Count Three because Count three concerned a breach of public
duty by DOA, a governmental entity subject to the procurement statutes at issue.
b.

ENA and Qwest Were Parties to this Proceeding From the Beginning
Who Had the Opportunity to Protect Their Interests in the JEN
Contracts Pre-Appeal, on Appeal, and Post-Appeal.

Syringa's Complaint alleged that Qwest and ENA had interests in the IEN Contracts, as
Amended that could be affected by the relief sought against DOA in Count Three. These
allegations started with the Introduction of the Complaint:
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The DOA decision to award ENA - Syringa's partner - all of the
substantive educational components of the IEN implementation
and to award Qwest all of the IEN telecommunications was
unnecessary, arbitrary and a violation oflaw.
(Augmented R. p. 19.) More specific allegations followed in paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39,
40, 44, 69, 93 and 94 of the Complaint. (Augmented R. pp. 24-33.) The allegations of Paragraph
44 in Count One, for example, state that ENA was prohibited from using local loop providers
other than Qwest to deliver its services:
44.
Upon information and belief, ENA, part of the IEN
Alliance, has made numerous requests that the State use Syringa
for the IEN technical work. See E-mail from Bob Collie, ENA, to
Greg Lowe, Syringa, dated July 27, 2009 and attached herein as
Exhibit D. ("ENA has requested multiple times that the State use
any local loop provider who can deliver the quality, price and time
requirements, similar to what we contemplated in the proposal.
The State has rejected requests to use Syringa for the IEN technical
work.... [t]he State has made it impossible for [ENA] to use
Syringa or anyone other than Qwest for that matter, to provide
100% of the local loop, backbone and core equipment ... ").
(Augmented R. p. 26.)

Following paragraph 44, paragraph 69 in Count Two alleges the

amendment of the IEN SBPOs in violation of Idaho Code § 67-5718A and attaches Qwest
Amendment No. 1 as Exhibit E in support of its allegation. (Augmented R. p. 29.) Exhibit E
(Qwest Amendment No. 1) not only identifies Qwest as "general contractor for all IEN technical
services;" it also identifies exclusive duties assigned to ENA in eight of its nine operative
paragraphs and ends by stating "[t]he State considers Qwest and ENA as equal partners in the
IEN project .... " (Augmented R. pp. 472-476.)
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Count Three follows with specific claims against DOA under the following heading:
COUNT THREE
Declaratory Relief
Violation of Idaho Code §67-5718A by DOA

(Augmented R. p. 30.) The first paragraph of Count Three begins by incorporating the foregoing
76 paragraphs of the Complaint.

The allegations incorporated into Count Three from the

preceding 76 paragraphs of the complaint included paragraphs and allegations that identified
Qwest and ENA as parties to the proceeding (Augmented R. pp. 20-21 (117-10)), identified their
interest in the IEN awards and Amendments No. 1 (Augmented R. pp. 29-30 (1i126-45 and 6576)) and identified them as "equal partners" by reference to Qwest Amendment No. 1, which is
attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint. These incorporated paragraphs and exhibits also alleged
that DOA violated its statutory duties under Idaho Code§ 67-5718A.
Paragraph 94 in Count Three of the Complaint sought declaratory judgment declaring the
amended IEN Purchase Order to Qwest void pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5725. (Augmented R.
p. 33.) The effect of the requested declaration would not, however, be limited solely to the
interests of Qwest. Invalidation of the amended IEN Purchase Order to Qwest would also, to the
clear terms of Qwest Amendment No. 1 (Exhibit E to the Complaint) affect the interests of
Qwest's "equal partner" ENA.
Count Three sought the specific relief of a declaratory judgment against DOA because
DOA is the governmental party that violated Idaho Code § 67-5718(2), IDAPA 38.05.01.052,
and Idaho Code§ 67-5718A when it issued Amendments No. 1.
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Qwest and ENA, as non-governmental parties, had an interest in the IEN SBPOs, but
were not subject to the statutory duties that applied to DOA. It would have been inappropriate,
in the absence of duty, for Syringa to make a claim against Qwest and ENA in Count Three. 5
SyTinga was not required under UDJA or the cases cited by Appellants to specifically name ENA
and Qwest on the heading of Count Three or to make a claim against them in Count Three.
Neither DOA nor Qwest has presented any authority in support of the proposition that
Qwest and ENA were required to be "named as a defendant" or the object of a claim for relief to
satisfy the requirements of the UDJA.

The authority presented involves situations where

necessary parties were entirely absent from the proceeding. Syringa was required to include
ENA and Qwest in the proceedings, and they were included.
Qwest and ENA were, as demonstrated above, parties to the pre-appeal proceedings with
notice that their rights in the Amended SBPOs could be affected by a ruling on Count Three.
Qwest and ENA also had the opportunity, as parties to the first appeal, to oppose Syringa's
arguments concerning Count Three. Neither chose to do so. (See State Respondents' Brief and
Cross-Appeal Brief, filed April 23, 2012; Defendant/Respondent Qwest's Brief, filed April 23,
2012; Appellee ENA Services, LLC, A Division of Education Networks of America, Inc.'s
Amended Response Brief, filed March 6, 2012.) The fact that Qwest and ENA did not oppose or
offer argument against Count Three before the first appeal or during the first appeal does not

5 ENA asserts as a possible defense that Syringa lacks standing as to ENA because Syringa sought no relief
against ENA in Count Three and that the award to ENA did not cause damages to Syringa. (ENA Opening Brief,
p. 50.) Count Three challenges DOA's IEN procurement award process. Syringa Networks, LLC, 305 P.3d at 505.
Syringa was not required to sue ENA for DOA's statutory violation. ENA's previewed defense is meritless.
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mean they were not parties to the proceeding involving Count Three. It means only that they
offered no direct argument in opposition to Syringa's prosecution of Count Three.

It is Syringa's contention that Qwest and ENA remained parties to the proceedings upon
the remar1d of Count T11ree, even if it v,as limited at the time of remand to the Qwest contract, as
amended, because they each had an interest in the scope of work described in Qwest Amendment
No. 1 that was attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint.
The District Court agreed that Qwest remained a party.

(R. p. 1403 (Amendment

Reconsideration Decision).) The District Court disagreed with Syringa's contention that ENA
remained a party after remand, but allowed the Amendment of Syringa's complaint to challenge
both IEN contracts, saying, "ENA must be made a party to this action."

(R. p. 1303

(Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) Although Syringa disagreed with the conclusion of
the District Court, it issued and served the Summons For Second Amended Post Appeal
Complaint on ENA as discussed above. ENA appeared by filing A Motion to Dismiss on July 17,
2014. (R. pp. 1434-1436.) ENA also presented argument opposing Syringa's summary judgment
motion. (Tr. p. 66, I. 21 - p. 69, 1. 6.) Qwest joined in DOA's summary judgment briefing. (R.
pp. 1480-1483, 1572-1574.)
Qwest and ENA were involved in every stage of this case and the UDJA's requirement
that all necessary parties be part of the "proceeding" was satisfied. See I.C. § 10-1211. This
Court's directive to proceed with the declaratory judgment action included the inherent direction
that all parties to the action on the remand remain as parties. To give effect to this Court's
directive that the declaratory judgment action proceed, ENA and Qwest had to be parties to the

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 27
3438924_8 [5821-112]

proceeding post-appeal. See Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 512; Hartman, 108 P.3d at 344-45;
Tomehak, 700 P.2d at 71. To avoid any question concerning the status of ENA after amendment
of the Complaint was allowed, the District Court required the service of a second summons on
ENA.
The District Court, in other words, took all necessary measures to ensure that all entities
made necessary by UDJA for the resolution of Count Three were parties to the post-appeal
proceedings and correctly concluded, before entering summary judgment, that "all necessary
parties have beenjoined and the Court has jurisdiction." (R. p. 1646.)
c.

Even if ENA and Qwest Were Not Properly Joined, the District
Court's Decision is Not Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Qwest and ENA were parties to this proceeding from the beginning. Even if, however,
this Court determines that Qwest and ENA were required to be listed on the heading for Count
Three and that Qwest and ENA were not properly joined because they were not listed in the
heading, their absence did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction to enter judgment on Count
Three.
In Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Casualty Company, this Court addressed
whether a declaratory judgment was void for failure to join necessary parties. 108 P .3d at 34445. The Hartman court began by explaining that it "narrowly construe[s] what constitutes a void
judgment," and that a judgment can be void based on lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction, or where it is entered in violation of due process. Id. at 344. The Hartman court
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found, however, that "[t]he fact that a party who is deemed necessary or indispensable is not
joined in the lawsuit does not render the judgment void." Id.
The Hartman court quoted the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 1998), which construed F.R.C.P. 19(b), the federal

version ofl.R.C.P. 19(a)(2) govemingjoinder:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) provides that persons who
claim an interest relating to the matter litigated and persons whose
presence in a suit is necessary to accord complete relief between
those who are already parties shall be joined in the action if they
are subject to service of process and their joinder in the litigation
will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rule 19(b)
then explains that if such a person "cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable."
As the emphasized language of Rule 19(b) indicates, however, the
requirement that a case shall not proceed absent joinder of all
indispensable persons is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but
rather an equitable rule "both in its origin and nature."
Id. (citing Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations omitted) (first
emphasis in original) (second emphasis added). The Hartman court explained that the failure to
join an indispensable party "was an affirmative defense that must be raised in the declaratory
judgment action" by motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7), "after which the burden falls on the
plaintiffs to join all 'parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration."' Hartman, 108 P.3d at 345 (citing LC. § 10-1211 and Tomehak, 700 P.2d at 71).
Hartman provides the applicable procedure for a defendant to follow who believes that
an indispensable party is missing from an action. That procedure gives the plaintiff the ability,
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under I.R.C.P. 19(a), to join any necessary parties to the action.

I.R.C.P. 19(a) mandates that a

court shall order joinder of the party unless the person cannot be made a party.

I.R.C.P.

19(a)(l)-(2). If joinder is not possible, the court must still "determine whether in equity and
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed,
the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." I.R.C.P. 19(a)(2).
DOA did not assert the affirmative defense that Syringa had failed to join an
indispensible party and did not follow the procedure outlined in Hartman pre-appeal.

That

procedure would have given Syringa the chance to clarify, pre-appeal, that Qwest and ENA were
parties to the Count Three proceeding or to move to join ENA and Qwest as defendants to Count
Three if the District Court determined that specific joinder in Count Three was necessary.
Instead, DOA attempted, post-appeal, to attack the District Court's pre-appeal jurisdiction.
DOA' s attempt to reach back and raise a pre-appeal issue post-appeal, if accepted, would
retroactively deprive Syringa of its ability under I.R.C.P. 19 and Hartman to join necessary
parties. DOA's attempt should be rejected for that reason.
Additionally, because this Court found in Hartman that the issue of failure to join a
necessary party under Idaho Code § 10-1211 is not jurisdictional and that a judgment entered in
absence of a necessary party "does not render the judgment void," DOA's argument that the
District Court and this Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Count Three is without merit.
Hartman, l 08 P .3d at 344.
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2.

The Rescission Amendments Did Not Moot Syringa's Claim.
a.

Rescission was Futile Because Contracts that are Void Cannot be
Rescinded.

One year and three months after the issuance of this Court's opinion in Syringa I and
more than five years after the commencement of operations under the IEN Contracts, as
Amended, DOA, ENA, and Qwest tried to moot this case by agreeing to rescind Amendments
No. 1. (R. pp. 1462-1479.) The District Court properly rejected this move because void contracts
cannot be rescinded.
(i)

The IEN Contracts, as Amended by Amendments No. 1 Are
Void.

This Court explained that the IEN contracts, as amended, violate Idaho Code § 675718(2) because:
By amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect,
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of LC.
§ 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052.
Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 506 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Employing the same logic,
the District Court reasoned that the illegality of the IEN contracts, as amended by Amendments
No. 1 extended to a violation ofldaho Code§ 67-5718A:
The amended contracts are contrary to state law because "[t]he
RFP did not seek bids for one contract to provide the backbone and
a separate contract to be thee-rate service provider." The logic of
the Court's reasoning also leads to the conclusion that a multiple
award that permitted contractors to provide different property
would also violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A.
(R. p. 1396 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision) (quoting Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505).) The
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District Court went on to conclude:
The Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is
not dicta. The Court determination that the amendment violated
state law is the law of this case and will be adhered to by this
Court. Contrary to DOA's argument, the Supreme Court has made
a determination that the February 26, 2009 amendments which
divided the scope of work between Qwest and ENA were contrary
to law.
(R. p. 1398 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) As this Court explained, "[a]ll contracts
made in violation of these statutes are void and any money advanced by the State in
consideration of such contracts must be repaid." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 504 (citing LC. § 675725). Amendments No. 1 are void because they violate Idaho Code §§ 67-5718(2) and 675718A.
(ii)

Void Contracts Cannot Be Rescinded.

Idaho authority is scant concerning whether void contracts can be rescinded but clear on
the point that "[Void] contracts are deemed never to have existed in the eyes of the law."

Thompson v. Ebbert, 160 P.3d 754, 757 (Idaho 2007) (brackets in original); see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY at 350 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a void contract as "[a] contract that is of no legal
effect, so that there is really no contract in existence at all"). Starting from the premise that void
contracts have no existence, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a void contract cannot be
rescinded because, in contrast to a voidable contract, a void contract never legally existed. See

Muncy v. City of O'Fallon, 145 S.W.3d 870, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (city contract did not
comply with statute and could not be rescinded because it was void); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Greatbanc Trust Co, 887 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (contract could not be rescinded
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that trustee had admitted was void ab initio ); TTSI Irrevocable Trust v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co.,
60 So.3d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (rescission not available where contract found to
be void rather than voidable); City of Beaumont v. Moore, 202 S.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Tex. 1947)
("VVhere a contract is ultra vires and void there is nothing to rescind."); Loxley S., L.L. C. v. W

Express, Inc., CIV.A. 10-0024-KD-N, 2011 WL 2469823, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2011) ("the
Agreement is void because it was made in violation of the Alabama subdivision regulation
statutes. In Drinkard v. Embalmers Supply Co., 14 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1943), the court held
that where a contract was void 'there is no occasion for a rescission; there is nothing to rescind.' .
. . Accordingly, there is no agreement to rescind (or enforce) in this case."); American Cas. Co.

of Reading, Pa. v. Mem 'l Hosp. Ass 'n, 223 F. Supp. 539, 542 (E.D. Wis. 1963) ("Technically, a
void contract is a nullity and there is nothing to rescind.").
The Rescission Amendments were futile. This case could not, and was not rendered
moot by the Rescission Amendments.

b.

The Rescission Amendments Defied Syringa I and Could Not Restore
the Status Quo.

The District Court could not give effect to the Rescission Amendments without ignoring
this Court's remand for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

This Court explained that

Syringa was injured by DOA's issuance of the IEN Contracts, as Amended because the process
deprived Syringa of the opportunity to bid separately for broadband connectivity services.

Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506.

If the District Court had permitted Appellants to rescind
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Amendments No. 1 and accepted Appellants' mootness argument, the injury identified by this
Court would not have been redressed.
Further, recognition of the attempted rescission would have been improper because
"rescission requires restoration to the status quo." White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (Idaho
2004). Appellants' supposed rescission could not restore the parties to the status quo because
Appellants performed under the Amended SBPOs for years and never cured or attempted to cure
the impact of Amendments No. 1 while it was in effect, or repay the tens of millions of dollars
paid for the work done according to Amendments No. 1. Restoration of the status quo of the
Original SBPOs, for example, would have required Qwest and ENA to be competitors for the
provision of "technical network services" and "internet services" (assigned exclusively to Qwest
by Amendments No. 1) nunc pro tune to 2009. To this point, the record reflects no change in the
operation of the IEN and no new opportunities for telecommunication providers to provide
service to the IEN offered or realized as a result of the Rescission Amendments. Indeed, voiding
the IEN Contracts, as Amended was the only remedy that could redress the injury sustained by
Syringa.
As the attempted rescission was not effective, Count Three was not moot and remained
ripe for adjudication, and the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Count Three.
c.

Recognized Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine Preclude a Finding
of Mootness Even if the Rescission Amendments were Effective.
(i)

DOA Could Return to its Illegal Behavior at Any Time.

Idaho follows federal law in recognizing the voluntary cessation exception to the
mootness doctrine. In O 'Boskey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Boise, this
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Court explained that generally, "[w ]here the conduct causing injury has been discontinued, the
dispute is moot .... " 739 P.2d 301, 306 (Idaho 1987). However, if a defendant voluntarily
ceases its behavior, "the trial court must be convinced that 'there is no reasonable expectation
that the wrong will be repeated."' Id. (citing United States v. W.T Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,633,
(1953)). And, "the burden on the defendant to make this showing 'is a heavy one."' O'Boskey,
739 P.2d at 306 (citing W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633). "The reason for so burdening the
defendant lies in inevitable questions concerning the motive of the defendant's voluntary
cessation." O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306. Further, "a party cannot conjure up mootness by ceasing
the challenged conduct only for practical or strategic reasons-such as avoiding litigation."
McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138 (D. Idaho 2013). "Courts also hesitate to
find a case moot when a party voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct but continues to argue
the lawfulness of the challenged conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
The O 'Boskey court ruled that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a
mootness argument and entering an injunction against the defendant where the defendant only
changed its disputed policy after an adverse appeal decision and an adverse District Court
decision. O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306.

Similarly, in this case DOA attempted to rescind

Amendments No. 1 to moot this case and escape the impact of an adverse decision from this
Court in Syringa I.

Similar to the defendant in O 'Boskey, DOA continued IEN operations

without change after Syringa I, never offered a substantive defense of Amendments No. 1 and
persists in the assertion of procedural and jurisdictional arguments that are designed to remove
the IEN Contracts, as Amended, from the reach of judicial review. (See DOA Opening Brief.)
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If this case is found moot, DOA remains free to engage in the same contract manipulation

that this Court renounced without meeting its burden of showing "there is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated."

O'Boskey, 739 P.2d at 306.

Under these

circumstances, the voluntary cessation exception forecloses a finding of rnootness.
(ii)

There is a Substantial Public Interest in the Determination of
Syringa's Declaratory Judgment Action.

The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is also an obstacle to the
Rescission Amendments. "Under this exception, even if the case is determined to be moot, if the
issue presented is one of substantial public interest, the Court may address the issue for future
direction and guidance." Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ.,
912 P.2d 644, 652 (Idaho 1996) (ruling that despite a sunset provision in a challenged regulation,
case not moot because there was a public interest in the issue of whether the regulations
complied with the state constitutional provision concerning thoroughness of the education
system) (citing Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 887 P.2d 35, 37 (Idaho 1994)); see
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 119 P .3d 624, 626 (Idaho 2005) (claim
concerning use of public funds in elections not moot even though election had passed because
there was public interest in resolution of the issue).
In this case, Syringa has challenged whether the executive branch ofldaho's government

can violate procurement law by amending competitively bid public contracts worth tens of
millions of dollars after the bidding has been closed and later agree to rescind the unlawful
amendments after substantial performance and without re-opening the contracts to competitive
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bidding. The public has a substantial interest in determination of this action. As this Court
pointed out in its decision in this case: "Subsection (3) [of LC. § 67-5718A] obviously intends,
for the benefit of the taxpayers, that the multiple bidders who are awarded contracts will remain

as competitors, which will only occur if they are furnishing the same or similar prnpcrty. Syringa
I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). Just as Idaho's procurement laws benefit Idaho taxpayers,

violations of those laws injure taxpayers.
The public has a substantial interest in determination of this action because DOA violated
public contracting laws that were established for the benefit of taxpayers and thus the Rescission
Amendments could not moot this case.
(iii)

DOA's Conduct is Capable of Repetition But Evading Review.

Idaho also recognizes that "an exception to the mootness doctrine exists if the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review." A clear example of the problem addressed by this
exception is provided by Idaho School for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board
ofEducation, in which this Court explained:

Theoretically, the Board could promulgate new standards every
year, sunsetting the previous year's standards. If this were the case,
then each time a declaratory judgment action is filed claiming that
the method of school funding is not "thorough" under that year's
standards, the District Court could dismiss the case as moot
claiming that those standards had been sunsetted. Thus, a situation
arises wherein the case is repetitive or continuing, but is incapable
of being resolved.
912 P.2d at 651 (holding the case was not moot). If this case were dismissed for mootness, the
DOA could continue to amend contracts in violation ofldaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2)
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and simply "rescind" those unlawful amendments each time they are challenged in order to moot
the case and avoid review.
In summary, Appellants' attempted rescission ab initio of the Amendments No. 1 was
ineffective because void contracts cannot be rescinded. Further, even if this Court were to hold
that DOA and its contractors could rescind Amendments No. 1, it should also find that this case
falls within exceptions to the mootness doctrine that preclude dismissal on that basis.
C.

The District Court Correctly Ruled that the Amended SBPOs Violate Idaho
Procurement Statutes.
1.

The District Court's Decision was Consistent with this Court's Decision in
Syringal.
a.

The District Court Properly Followed the Law of the Case Established
by Syringa I.

This Court unambiguously stated in Syringa /that DOA violated the law. 6 "By amending
the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer furnishing the same or similar property, the
State has, in effect, changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation of LC. § 675718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). This Court
specifically noted that DOA attempted to "do indirectly what it [was] prevented by law from
doing directly," and that this two-step approach was "obviously not permissible when considered
in light of subsection (3)" of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). In this
Court's words, DOA's actions constituted a "mere scheme[] to evade law" that the Court would
"sweep ... aside as so much rubbish." Id. at 506 (citation omitted).

6 Going a step further, this Court unambiguously stated that DOA obviously violated the law. Syringa I,
305 P.3 at 505.
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These legal principles and rules were necessary to this Court's conclusion that Syringa
was injured by DOA's conduct, and had standing to redress the injury. According to Syringa I,
Amendments No. 1 made a material change to the description of the work sought by the IEN
RFP and Syringa suffered a "distinct a.11d palpable injury not suffered by all Idaho citizens"
because "Syringa would have bid to perform the work specified in the amended contract awarded
to Qwest." Id. ("Syringa has standing to challenge the amended contract to Qwest because it
constituted, in effect, changing the RFP after the bids were opened.").
DOA and Qwest contend this Court's conclusions regarding the illegality of DOA's
actions are non-binding dicta. (DOA Opening Brief at 25-30; Qwest Opening Brief at 11-16.)
This Court's conclusions regarding DOA's unlawful conduct were not statements "said in
passing." 7 They were necessary to this Court's ultimate conclusion regarding standing. As such,
they are the law of the case which govern the remand and this appeal. Spur Prods. Corp., 153
P .3d at 1162 ( citation omitted). In fact, Syringa I cannot be read any other way, at least in good
faith. 8 The District Court correctly recognized and applied these conclusions in its decisions.
(R. pp. 2028-2030 (Reconsideration Decision), 1649-1650 (Dispositive Decision), and 1398

"Obiter dictum" translates to "something said in passing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1102 (8th ed.
2004). Dicta are statements made in an opinion that are not necessary to the court's decision and, therefore, are
persuasive but not precedential. Id. "Ratio decidendi," which translates to "the reason for deciding," is the
"principle or rule of law on which a court's decision is founded." Id. at 1290. The reason for deciding an issue is
precedential and law of the case. See Spur Prods. Corp., 153 P.3d at 1162. This Court's conclusion that DOA
violated the law was necessary to its conclusion on standing, and is therefore binding ratio decidendi, not
persuasive-but-non-binding obiter dictum.
7

8 It seems everyone but Appellants recognized the import of this Court's decision. The federal government
stopped funding the JEN after Syringa I, leaving Idaho taxpayers on the hook for DOA's refusal to acknowledge the
obvious significance of this Court's decision. (R. p. 1650 (Dispositive Decision).)

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC 3438924_8 [5821-112]

39

(Amendment Reconsideration Decision).)
What's more, this Court already rejected DOA's arguments regarding Syringa I. After
Syringa I was released, DOA filed a petition for rehearing arguing that this Court should not
have addressed the iegaiity of DOA's actions because the appeal focused solely on standing.
(See Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013, at
1-8.)9 This Court denied the petition. (See Idaho Supreme Court Order dated July 11, 2013, p.
1.) In the words of the District Court, "that boat has sailed." (Tr. p. 28, 11. 17-18; see Tr. p. 36, I.

25 (noting the petition for rehearing was rejected).)
Even if this Court's conclusion that DOA violated the law was dicta, the analysis is sound
and the District Court did not err by following it. Though dicta is not binding, it is be persuasive.
Indeed, this Court frequently issues guidance for lower courts in the form of dicta. E.g., Vavold
v. State, 218 P.3d 388, 390 (Idaho 2009) ("[W]e note, admittedly by way of dicta, that we agree
with the District Court's conclusion that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law.");
Chandler v. Hayden, 215 P.3d 485, 492 (Idaho 2009) ("Although we recognize that this portion
of the opinion is dicta ... we address this issue in order to provide guidance to the District Court
in remand."). Even if correct, the contention by DOA and Qwest that this Court's statements in
Syringa I are dicta gets them nowhere: the District Court faithfully followed this Court's
guidance, and, in any case, reached its decision on a factual record developed on summary
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judgment. That is not error.
b.

The District Court Is Not the Arbiter of this Court's Jurisdiction. In
Any Case, Syringa I was a Proper Exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction.

DOA and Qwest argue that the District Court erroneously "interpreted" this Court's
decision in Syringa /because Syringa I exceeded this Court's jurisdiction. (DOA Opening Brief
at 27-29; Qwest Opening Brief at 13-16.) However, by deciding Syringa I, this Court implicitly
concluded it had appellate jurisdiction to decide the case the way it did. This Court's exercise of
appellate jurisdiction should be treated as "law of the case" shielded from collateral attack in the
same fashion as its substantive decision. Neilsen & Co. v. Cassia & Twin Falls Cnty. Joint Class
A Sch. Dist. 151, 647 P.2d 773, 775 (Ct. App. Idaho 1982) ("[T]he court in Neilson I necessarily

found that the losing contract had standing, because it instructed the trial court to award the
contractor damages. Although Neilson I does not address specifically the issues of standing, and
therefore the opinion's weight as authority for the proposition ... is lessened, the doctrine of the
'law of the case' prohibits us from reviewing the Supreme Court's finding."). Further, a party
seeking to challenge a decision of this Court must do so by filing a petition for rehearing, which
DOA did. Id. at 776. This Court rejected the petition. This Court is the arbiter of its appellate
jurisdiction. The District Court is not. The District Court was compelled to follow this Court's
conclusions, in Syringa I and on rehearing, that it had jurisdiction to decide Syringa I the way it

9 DOA acknowledged this Court's conclusion that DOA violated the law in its petition for rehearing. (See
Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Petition for Rehearing, filed May 3, 2013, at 2 ("[T]he Court opined
that the amendments violated the statute.") and 8 ("In essence, this Court opined that the amendment to the SBPOs
violated I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052, and that, as a result, Syringa has standing to challenge that
amendment."). Having recognized that this Court "opined that the amendments violated the statute," DOA cannot
now pretend that this Court did not.
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did.
This Court can defend its own jurisdiction against Defendants' collateral attack; it does
not need Syringa to do so. Regardless, this Court had jurisdiction to decide Syringa I the way it
did. This Court has a statutorv dutv to "nass upon and determine all the questions of law
.,

.,

i

involved in the case presented upon ... appeal, and necessary to the final determination of the
case." LC. § 1-205.
Although Idaho Code § 1-205 applies, by its terms, when a new trial is granted, this
Court has applied the statute to the context of preliminary decisions such as standing. Doe v.

State, 352 P.3d 500, 504 (Idaho 2015) ("Because we remand to the District Court, we must
address the issue in Doe's original petition . . . as it is a question of law necessary to
determination of the case.") (citation omitted); see also Cummings v. Cummings, 765 P.2d 697,
701 (Ct. App. Idaho 1988) ("Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an
issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance for other issues
on remand.").

Doe v. State is particularly on point. There, the District Court concluded that an out-ofstate resident did not have standing to obtain a determination whether he was required to register
as a sex offender in Idaho. 352 P.3d at 503. This Court overturned the standing conclusion. And
it went further. Recognizing its duty to address legal issues necessary to determination of the
case, the Court addressed the merits:
The District Court, having dismissed the petition for lack of
standing, did not rule on the issue of whether Doe's Washington
offense was substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense requiring
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registration. Because we remand to the District Court, we must
address the issue in Doe's original petition-whether his
Washington offense is substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense
requiring offender registration-as it is a question oflaw necessary
to determination of the case. LC. § 1-205 ....
Doe, 352 P.3d at 504 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Syringa I, DOA' s unlawful conduct was a question of law that was
necessary to the final determination of the case. As such, this Court had jurisdiction to address
the issue under Idaho Code § 1-205 and Doe v. State.
In addition, as a practical matter, standing is not always cleanly separate from the merits
of a case. Some discussion of the merits--or at least the governing law or contract-is often
necessary to identify and define the scope of the plaintiffs injury. For example, in State v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., the State argued it had standing because funds were unlawfully withheld
from it under arbitration agreements. 354 P.3d 187, 193 (Idaho 2015). In addressing the State's
standing, this Court looked to the contracts and agreements at issue:
[U]nder the MSA, funds may be disbursed from the DPA only
when disputes are "resolved with finality." As to Idaho, only the
year 2003 will be resolved with "finality" by the Panel. Thus, the
State would not have been entitled to DP A funds under the terms
of the MSA .... Simply put, the State's failure to receive funds to
which it is not entitled under the MSA does not constitute injury.
Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Doe v. State, this Court analyzed the applicable statutes to identify and
define the plaintiffs injury:
The Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act (SORA)
requires a person sentenced for an offense identified in the Act to
register with the state's central sexual offender registry
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("Registry"). LC. § 18-8306(1). In particular, a person convicted
of violating Idaho Code section 18-1506 is required to register. I. C.
§ 18-8304(1)(a). The Registry is maintained on a publicly
accessible website. SORA applies in relevant part to anyone who
"has been convicted of any crime ... in another jurisdiction ... that
is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)
... and enters this state to establish residence or for employment
purposes .... " I.C. § 18-8304(1)(b). "Employed" means full-time or
part-time employment for more than 10 consecutive working days
or an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year. I.C. §
18-8303(6).
352 P.3d at 503. Based on this statutory analysis, this Court determined that the plaintiff had
alleged a current harm and, therefore, had standing. Id.
Consistent with Phillip Morris and Doe, some discussion of the merits was necessary in
Syringa I to identify and define Syringa's injury and determine how the injury could be
redressed. As in Phillip Morris and Doe, the statutes are clear, and the legal analysis is not
difficult: DOA's actions were "obviously not permissible when considered in light of subsection
(3)" of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. Syringa I, 305 P.3d. at 505 (emphasis added). The Court's
analysis of procurement law was well within this Court's jurisdiction.
Finally, despite DOA and Qwest's dogged insistence to the contrary, the issue of
illegality was brought up in the first appeal. Syringa raised the issue in its briefing, going so far
as to say that the issue was "squarely before this Court." (Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed
June 4, 2012 at 2-4.) In fact, Members of this Court were keenly interested in the legality of the
contracts. (Oral Argument Recording, Disc 1, at 06:24-08:40; 11:00-12:52; 27:40-28:35; 30:30-
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31 :37; 32:30-37: 15; 48:00-51 :30). 10
In the initial appeal, as well as in this one, the Defendants repeatedly refused to "take off
the blinders" and address the obvious statutory violation. In the initial appeal, as in this one, the
Court is not obligated to mirror Defendants' myopic focus on procedurai issues. It was free then,
and is free now, to address the DOA's failure to abide by the law.
In arguing that this Court lacked jurisdiction to decide Syringa I as it did, DOA and
Qwest do not cite a single case, and Syringa has found none, where an inferior court purports to
delineate the extent of a superior court's' jurisdiction. It seems self-evident that a lower court
does not have the authority to do so, particularly where the parties' jurisdictional arguments were
raised and rejected by the superior court on rehearing.
DOA and Qwest rely heavily on cases from the federal courts. (DOA Opening Brief at
27-29; Qwest Opening Brief at 13-16 (both citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), Hill v.
Houston, 764 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1985), Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). These cases, of
course, are not binding. Nor are they persuasive. Federal courts exercise only the limited
jurisdiction granted to them under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. By contrast, as this
Court has recognized, it has "inherent power to render decisions regarding Idaho law." Sunshine
Mining Co. v. Allendal Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Idaho 1983). Moreover, as discussed
above, this Court routinely addresses legal issues that define a plaintiffs injury and guide the

10

Justice Jim Jones went so far as to tell DOA that the Court could handle the standing question; he was
interested in DOA's statutory authority for splitting the award. (Oral Argument Recording, Disc l, at 32:00-38:00).
DOA failed to provide statutory authority for its actions. Id. Instead, it insisted that the RFP allowed it to pick and
choose who would provide what service, and that the award was split geographically. Id. As this Court recognized,
the award was not split geographically and the RFP does not supersede statutes. 305 P.3d at 504,505 & n.l.
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lower courts on remand as directed by Idaho Code§ 1-205. In any case, none of the authority
cited by DOA or Qwest involves an inferior court policing the superior court's jurisdiction, or a
superior court allowing a collateral jurisdictional attack in a second appeal in the same case.
2.

The District Court Properly invalidated the Original SBPOs, As Amended
by Amendments No. 1.
a.

Syringa Presented Evidence in Support of Its Summary Judgment
Motion that was Not Rebutted by Respondents.

Syringa demonstrated in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that the IEN
Contracts, as Amended, were illegal and void.

(R. pp. 529-535.)

Syringa relied on the

documents relevant to the IEN procurement, including the IEN RFP, DOA's response to a
request for information concerning the end-to-end solution described in the IEN RFP, SBPO
1308 to Qwest, SBPO 1309 to ENA, Amendments No. 1 to SBPOs 1308 and 1309, and
subsequent amendments. (R. pp. 530-532.) Syringa also relied on deposition testimony from
DOA purchasing administrator Bill Bums who admitted that Amendments No. 1 changed the
IEN contracts from contracts for the "same or similar" property and services to contracts for
dissimilar property and services. (R. pp. 532-532.)
Syringa argued, based on the procurement documents, including Amendments No. 1, and
the testimony of DOA purchasing administrator Bill Bums that "the material facts are clear and
undisputed" and that Amendments No. 1 split the IEN project into separate contracts for
dissimilar services in violation of Idaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2). (R. pp. 532-534.)
Syringa further argued that this Court's decision provided a clear analysis of the applicable
procurement statutes and that DOA's issuance of Amendments No. 1 did not comply with those
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statutes. (R. pp. 533-534.) Syringa did not rely solely on Syringa I in moving for summary
judgment but set forth the applicable facts and law which included this Court's decision.
DOA made no argument that the procurement documents were ambiguous, offered no
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procurement statutes in opposition to Syringa's motion. Instead, DOA offered jurisdictional and
procedural arguments, affidavits with inadmissible testimony to the effect that DOA had not
"intended" Amendments No. 1 to "contractually limit the services available from Qwest and
ENA under SBPOs 1308 and 1309" (R. pp. 1122-1123 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at ,r,r 37-40)), and
the contention that the Rescission Amendments rendered the case moot. (R. pp. 1546-1571; see
also Ex. 1 to the Affidavit of Melodie A. McQuade in Support of Syringa Networks, LLC's

Supplemental Motion to Augment the Record ("Supplemental McQuade Affidavit"). 11 ) DOA
also presented irrelevant hearsay testimony concerning Syringa's purported unwillingness to
divide up IEN territory between Qwest and Syringa. (R. pp. 1121-1122 (Aff. of Greg Zickau at

,r,r 33-36; see also Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.)
To the extent DOA argues it "has not been given an opportunity to present and argue
evidence substantiating its defenses to Count Three of Syringa's Complaint," the Record reflects
otherwise. (DOA Opening Brief at p. 28 n. 8.) The evidence that was presented, however, was
of no import. The evidence concerning the "intent" of DOA in imposing Amendments No. 1 was
immaterial because the Amendments are unambiguous and DOA's evidence of intent is

11 Syringa filed a Supplemental Motion to Augment the Record with this Court on December 8, 2015 that
was supported by an affidavit attaching one document: Plaintiff's Rule 56(e) Objections to Affidavits and
Deposition Testimony filed by the Defendant Idaho Department of Administration, filed October 3, 2014.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 47
3438924_8 [5821-112)

irrelevant. (See Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.) The same is true regarding the
proposed hearsay evidence alleging that Syringa did not want to "divide up" IEN territory with
Qwest. (See Ex. 1 to Supplemental McQuade Affidavit.)
Prnsented with undisputed facts that Amendments No. 1 changed the IEN SBPOs so they
no longer requested the "same or similar services" from Qwest and ENA, the unambiguous
language of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), and this Court's decision, the District
Court correctly ruled that Amendments No. 1 unlawfully divided the IEN project into separate
contracts for dissimilar services in violation of Idaho Code §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), and
IDAPA

38.01.01.052.

(R.

pp.

1649-1651

(Dispositive

Decision),

pp.

2028-2030

(Reconsideration Decision).)
b.

The District Court Properly Determined that the IEN Contracts, As
Amended, Violate the Law and are Void.

DOA and Qwest contend that the District Court erred by holding that the IEN Contracts,
as Amended, are void. In support of their position, they argue that only Amendments No. 1 are
unlawful and that the original IEN contracts should be restored. None of the multiple reasons
advanced for this contention, however, square with the holding in Syringa I that Syringa suffered
an injury "that is alleged to have been caused by the challenged conduct and that can be
redressed by judicial relief." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. That relief, for Syringa, which was
foreclosed by the description in the RFP from bidding separately on the "technical network
services" and "internet services" assigned exclusively to Qwest by Amendments No. 1, was to
declare the IEN Contracts, as Amended void and to open a new competitive bidding process for
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"telecommunications services and equipment for the IEN" as required by Idaho Code § 675745E.
(i)

The Only Remedy Available to Redress the Injury Sustained
by Syringa as a Result of the Material Change Made to the
IEN Scope of Work by Amendments No. 1 Is a Judgment
Declaring the IEN Contracts, As Amended, to be Void.

DOA Director Michael Gwartney made it clear in his March 19, 2010 Affidavit that
Amendments No. 1 made material changes to the identical IEN contracts that were memorialized
by SBPOs 1308 and 1309. Mr. Gwartney testified:
After the initial award, Administration then unilaterally determined
how best to divide the work between the two awardees/contractors.
Administration's determination was based upon the individual
strengths of each awardees/contractors' proposals. For example,
ENA had expertise in providing E-rate services and providing
video teleconferencing operations. Qwest had expertise in
providing the technical operations (i.e., the backbone). Before
Amendment 1 to SBPO 01308 and SBPO 01309 were issued,
Administration contemplated various ways to divide the
responsibilities between Qwest and ENA, including but not limited
to dividing the services to be provided by Qwest and ENA
regionally. However, the division of responsibilities reflected in
the Amendments 1s is a reflection of what Administration believed
would best serve the State of Idaho and the schools.

***
While I understand Syringa 's frustration, the fact is that Qwest
was awarded the technical services portion of JEN (i.e., the
backbone). ENA was not. Just as both Syringa and IRON, the
other backbone partner in ENA's proposal are not directly
benefitting from the IEN contract, because of the division of
responsibilities, some of Qwest's listed partners are not directly
benefitting from its IEN contract (e.g., Cisco systems, Inc) ... This
is not the result of some conspiracy to "shut out" Syringa, IRON,
or even Cisco; it is simply the natural consequence of the division
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of work under the contracts.
(Augmented R. pp. 735-736 (Aff. of J. Michael Gwartney at

,r 11).)

Mr. Gwartney's affidavit

testimony is consistent with the language of Amendments No. 1 and the clear fact that
Amendments No. 1 materially changed the original IEN contracts by stripping the provision of
technical network services from ENA's contract. Although the use of language was different,
this Court treated Amendments No. 1 as material amendments by stating:
The separate contracts as amended no longer conform to the RFP's
description of the property to be acquired. The description of
property to be provided by Qwest under its amended contract is not
a minor deviation from the property to be provided by the
successful bidder under the RFP, nor is the property to be provided
by ENA under its amended contract.
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added).

Syringa has been unable to find Idaho case law, other than the decision of this Court in
this case, that addresses the effect of illegal amendments on otherwise valid government
contracts. 12 Courts in other states have, however, addressed the issue. These courts have held
that material amendments to competitively bid public contracts are impermissible and have ruled

12 DOA and Qwest cite to Knowlton v. Mudd, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. Idaho 1989) for the proposition that
an unlawful contract amendment has no effect on the underlying contract. Knowlton involved a contract amendment
that was voidable because one of the parties to the amendment lacked capacity. 775 P.2d at 155-56. The Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court's decision finding the amendment void and left the original contract that had not
been challenged intact. Id. at 156-57. Knowlton did not involve competitively bid public contracts, a public entity or
violation of public procurement statutes and is not at all analogous or applicable to the instant case.

DOA and Qwest identify no cases involving competitively bid contracts in support of the argument that the
Original SBPOs should be reinstated. The only case cited by DOA and Qwest that involved a contract with a public
entity is Ferkin v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 25, Town of Hempstead, Nassau Cnty., 15 N.E.2d 799
(N.Y. 1938). Ferkin, however, did not involve competitively bid contracts. 15 N.E.2d at 799-800. Additionally,
Ferkin involved multiple separate contracts, not contracts that were subsequently amended. Id. ("There is nothing in
the supplemental agreement which evidences and intent that the agreement should be substituted for or operate to
nullify the original agreements."). Ferkin is thus inapposite.
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that illegal amendments can render both the amendment and underlying contract void.

The

description of Syringa's injury and the analysis of redressability and standing in Syringa I
demonstrate that this Court may have contemplated the same remedy.
The Alaska Supreme Court explained its analysis of the impact of material amendments
on the competitive bidding process as follows:
[G]enerally a government contract that was initially competitively
bid cannot be materially amended because that is tantamount to
forming a new contract, which should be accomplished by starting
all over again with competitive bidding. This rule has been
judicially imposed in order to guard against circumvention of
competitive bidding requirements. Competitive bidding itself is
designed to ensure that government obtains the most favorable
terms possible in its contracts, and to protect the public from the
possibility of favoritism, fraud, and corruption on the part of public
officials.

Kenai Lumber Co., Inc. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215,220 (Alaska 1982) (citation omitted) (finding
amendment immaterial); accord Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 433 (Alaska 1998). Maryland's
highest court explained the concept in a similar way:
The generally accepted rule is that where a statute requires that a
contract for public work shall be let to the lowest responsible
bidder, a municipal corporation or administrative agency cannot
evade the law by making substantial changes in the contract after it
has been awarded pursuant to the law. In short, the municipality or
agency cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing
directly.

Hanna v. Bd. ofEd. of Wicomico Cnty., 87 A.2d 846, 849 (Md. 1952) (emphasis added). 13
Although the determination whether a public contract amendment is "material" can be

13 For a similar statement of the emphasized law, see Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 505 ("A government agency
may not do indirectly what it is prevented by law from doing directly.").
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fact dependent, the most important fact is the impact of the amendment on the competitive
bidding process:
Not all amendments to competitively bid contracts are prohibited,
only those regarded as material. The concept of materiality in this
context has not been satisfactoriiy captured in a single phrase. One
court has spoken of 'an essential change of such magnitude as to
be incompatible with the general scheme' of competitive bidding;
another has phrased the question to be whether the amendment 'so
varied from the original plan, was of such importance, or so altered
the essential identity or main purpose of the contract, that it
constitutes a new undertaking.' These formulations simply
recognize that the materiality concept prohibits those changes
which tend to be subversive of the purposes of competitive
bidding.
Ki/a, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., 876 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Alaska 1994). The most important
consideration in other words, concerns whether an amendment to a competitively bid public
contract undermines or undoes the statutory competitive bidding scheme. See, e.g., Hanna, 87
A.2d at 849 (where board of education provisionally awarded school construction contract and
subsequently changed the scope of work to be performed by the winning bidder and awarded the
contract without re-advertising for new bids, the contract violated competitive bidding rules and
thus construction under the contract was enjoined); Hanisco v. Twp. of Warminster, 41 A.3d 116,
123-26 (Pa. Cornrnw. Ct. 2012) (where an amendment changed the price terms of a public
contract between a township and a waste-services contractor by establishing a rebate, a new
bidding process was required) ("Where, as here, there is deviation from the requirements of
public bidding, the proper procedure is to ... readvertise, and secure another open competitive
bidding so that all of the bidders would be on an equal footing.").
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Like the above cases, Amendments No. 1 made material changes to the scope of work to
be performed under SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and undermined the purpose of Idaho's competitive
bidding statutes. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506. This Court ruled Syringa has standing only when
Amendments No. 1 are viewed in the context of the "entire bidding process." Id. at 505. Viewed
in that fashion, this Court concluded that "by amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA
were no longer furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect changed the RFP
after the bids had been opened in violation of I.C. § 67-5718(2) and IDAPA 38.05.01.052." Id.
Amendments No. 1, in other words, so undermined the competitive bid process that it, and the
contracts that resulted could not be repaired.
Syringa's injury, according to this Court, was the inability to submit a separate bid to
perform the technical network services (backbone) work that was assigned exclusively to Qwest
by Amendments No. 1. This injury cannot be redressed "in isolation" by declaring Amendments
No. 1 to be void and restoring the original IEN SBPOs. Id. Redress, in this case, is represented
by the District Court holding the IEN Contracts, as Amended, void.
(ii)

Law of the Case Did Not Estop Syringa From Challenging the
IEN Contracts, as Amended.

Syringa argued in the first appeal that the original SBPOs were lawful but that their
amendment violated the law. (See Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Brief, filed February 27, 2012 at
24-27, 32-34, 51; Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed June 4, 2012 at 2-4).) This Court agreed:
By amending the contracts so that Qwest and ENA were no longer
furnishing the same or similar property, the State has, in effect,
changed the RFP after the bids had been opened in violation ofI.C.
§ 67-5718(2) and IDAP A 38.05.01.052. The separate contracts as
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amended no longer conform to the RFP' s description of the
property to be acquired. The description of property to be provided
by Qwest under its amended contract is not a minor deviation from
the property to be provided by the successful bidder under the
RFP, nor is the property to be provided by ENA under its amended
contract.
Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). This Court remanded for consistent proceedings.
Id. at 512.
The District Court ruled, post-appeal, that Syringa was estopped from directly
challenging the issuance of the Original SBPOs as pretext to splitting the IEN work between
Qwest and ENA. (R. pp. 1399-1402 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).) The District
Court's decision, however, did not prevent the District Court from following the law of the case
established by this Court and allowing Syringa to amend its complaint to allege that the IEN
Contracts, as Amended, are void. (R. pp. 1397-1399 (Amendment Reconsideration Decision).)
(iii)

Syringa Was Not Estopped From Challenging Amended
SBPO 1309 to ENA.

Judicial estoppel precludes a party :from advantageously taking one position, then
subsequently asserting a second position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v.
Wood, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (Idaho 2005). "Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party from assuming
a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent
proceeding." Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. Idaho 1998). "The
doctrine of judicial estoppel sounds in equity and is invoked at the discretion of the court."
Sword v. Sweet, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (Idaho 2004).
The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial system, by
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protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial
proceeding." A & J Const. Co., 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 952
P.2d at 916). Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with
the legal system, Id,; see also 31 CJ,S, Estoppel and Waiver§ 186 (2012). Judicial estoppel
protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; therefore, it is not necessary to
demonstrate individual prejudice. A & J Const. Co., 116 P .3d at 16 (citation omitted). "Judicial
estoppel must be applied with caution and in the narrowest of circumstances so as to avoid
impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a
contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel
and Waiver§ 68.
Syringa consistently challenged the legality of the Amended SBPOs since early in the
case. The original complaint was filed December 15, 2009. (Augmented R. pp. 17-21.) On
February 23, 2010, Syringa filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause that concerned the Amended
SBPO to Qwest and the Amended SBPO to ENA and asked the Court to issue an Order directed
to DOA to show cause:
Why the DOA should not be enjoined from acqumng further
services or property for the IEN Project pursuant to Statewide
Blanket Purchase Orders 1308-01 and 1309-01 or from otherwise
directing Education Networks of America, Inc. to select Qwest
Communications
Company,
LLC
as
the
exclusive
telecommunications supplier for the IEN Project.
(Augmented R. p. 564; see Augmented R. pp. 666-688.)
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Syringa again contended, in support of a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
dismissing Count Three of its complaint, that both the February 26, 2009 Amended SBPOs
violated state procurement law:
The fundamental question presented by this Motion for
Reconsideration concerns whether there is an administrative
remedy associated with the amendment of contracts for the
purchase of goods or services by the State that, if not pursued,
defeats the right of an injured party with standing to pursue a
declaratory judgment to determine the legality of the contract
amendments under Idaho Code§§ 67-5718A and/or 67-5726. The
contract amendments, in this case, are Amended SBPOs 1308-02
[sic] and 1309-02 [sic] that removed the internet backbone and
connectivity portions of the IEN project from ENA and its
subcontractor, Syringa, and assigned the work exclusively to
Qwest.
(Augmented R. p. 1226.)
Syringa persisted in its contention that the IEN Contracts, as Amended to Qwest and
ENA violated state procurement law both pre-appeal and on appeal. (See, e.g., Augmented Conf.
R. p. 44; Augmented R. pp. 2226-2227; Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Brief, filed in this Court
February 27, 2012 at 24-27, 32-34, 48-51; Syringa Networks' Reply Brief, filed in this Court
June 4, 2012 at 2-9.) Syringa's Motion to Amend Count Three of the Complaint to assert the
illegality of the Amended SBPO to ENA following remittitur was, in fact, entirely consistent
with its earlier positions and challenges to both SBPOs, as amended.
Further, judicial estoppel does not apply against a party who "never obtained a judgment,
advantage or consideration" from the asserting party. Smith v. US.R. V. Properties, LLC, 118
P.3d 127, 132 (Idaho 2005) (citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 719 P.2d 1169, 1175
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(Idaho 1986)). Syringa obtained no advantage from any sort of alleged change in position.
Additionally, as demonstrated above, Syringa consistently challenged the IEN procurement
process that resulted in the Amended SBPOs.

be foreclosed on grounds of judicial estoppel.
c.

Amendments No. 1 Affected the Entire Scope of Services Described in
the IEN RFP and the Original SBPOs-Including Services to State
Agencies.

Broadband connections to state agencies were included within the scope of the IEN RFP,
the IEN contracts and the IEN contracts, as amended. As described supra in the Statement of
Facts, the state agencies were specifically added to the IEN RFP by Amendment 03 on
December 29, 2008 and were not excluded from Amendments No. 1 to the IEN SBPOs.
Additionally, Section 3.2 of the IEN RFP included schools and state agencies within the scope of
what it described as the Idaho Education Network and clearly stated that the intended IEN award
would involve the provision of service to E-rate eligible entities as well as the provision of
service to non-E-rate eligible entities, including state agencies. SBPOs 1308 and 1309 also state
that the contracts are for the benefit and Idaho schools, agencies, and other institutions.
The District Court properly held that its ruling applied to all work under the Amended
SBPOs. (R. pp. 2030-2031 (Reconsideration Decision).) Qwest's argument that state agency
services were not subject to the IEN Contracts, as Amended, is contradicted by the record.
3.

Courts Have an Independent Duty to Invalidate Illegal Contracts.

This Court recognized in Syringa I that contracts issued in violation of state procurement
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law "are void." 305 P.3d at 514 ("All contracts made in violation of these statues are void and
any money advanced by the State in consideration of such contracts must be repaid.").
Consistent with this conclusion, on remand, the District Court determined that the IEN Contracts,
as Amended, were issued in violation of state law and were, therefore, illegai and void. (R. pp.
1646-1651 (Dispositive Decision).)
Even if the multitude of procedural and technical arguments raised by Appellants
concerning Syringa' s ability to challenge the IEN Contracts, as Amended, had merit, the District
Court's decision to declare the contracts void, is, without doubt, the right decision.
Idaho courts have an independent duty to raise the issue of contract illegality and to void
contracts that are illegal. Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833, 842 (Idaho 1952) (raising, sua
sponte, and voiding illegal contract); Quiring v. Quiring, 944 P.2d 695, 701-02 (Idaho 1997)
(raising and voiding illegal contract when issue was not argued or addressed below); Hyta v.
Finley, 53 P.3d 338, 340-41 (Idaho 2002) (raising and voiding illegal contract when issue was
not raised by the parties or addressed by the District Court); Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc. v. Flying
Joseph Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136, 1139-40 (Idaho 2011) (raising, sua sponte, issue of illegal
contract); Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 841-42 (Idaho 2011) (voiding illegal
contract, though District Court held that party did not have standing to assert illegality); Hill v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 812, 822 (Idaho 2011) ("the Court must not enforce any
contract 'at any stage in the litigation' in which it becomes apparent that the provision
contravenes public policy"); AED, Inc. v. KDC Invests., LLC, 307 P.3d 176, 184 (Idaho 2013)
(voiding illegal contract).
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"The duty to avoid enforcing an invalid contract term is so strong that Idaho's courts
must raise the public policy issue sua sponte if necessary." Hill, 249 P .3d at 822 (emphasis
added). When raising the issue of illegality, an Idaho court "does not concern itself as to the
manner in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention." Taylor, 261 P.3d
at 841 (quoting Stearns, 240 P.2d at 842). The duty to void illegal contracts exists if the issue is
not raised on appeal or decided below, Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P.3d at 1139-40; if the issue
was not pled by any party, Hyta, 53 P .3d at 340-41; and if the District Court held that a party did
not have standing to assert illegality, Taylor, 26 l P .3d at 841. This duty extends to simple
statutory violations, such as a contractor failing to register, and to complex ones like violation of
federal antitrust laws. AED, Inc., 307 P.3d at 184-85 (voiding contract that violated contractorregistration law); Pines Grazing Ass 'n, 265 P .3d at 1139-41 (voiding contract, sua sponte, that
violated the federal Sherman Antitrust Act).
DOA argues that this Court's ruling in City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 299 P.3d 232
(Idaho 2013), required the District Court only to invalidate Amendments No. 1 and to leave the
original SBPOs intact. But Petra has no bearing on this case. (DOA Opening Brief at 37-39.)
The Petra case involved a contract's failure to comply with public works contract
backlog requirements, which the city alleged rendered the contract illegal and void. The Court,
however, held that the entire agreement was not void because the parties could legally operate
under the agreement by obtaining the required performance bond. Petra, 299 P.3d at 253. The
Petra court also noted that "there is no evidence that this agreement was 'made for the purpose
of furthering any matter' prohibited by statute, or that it was 'founded' on something illegal. The
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parties' goal was to construct a building, not to circumvent the State's performance bond
statute." Petra, 299 P .3d at 253. In stark contrast, this Court held in Syringa I held that DOA' s
IEN procurement process constituted a "scheme[] to evade law" and an unlawful attempt to do in
two steps what was prohibited in one. 305 P.3d at 506. Further, here a return to the original
SBPOs would not have redressed Syringa's injury, the inability to bid for broadband connectivity
services. This case is more similar to AED, Inc., where this Court distinguished Petra and
voided a contract based on the clear language of the Idaho Contractor Registration. 307 P.3d at
184-85.
The District Court properly recognized its duty under the Quiring line of cases and
properly declared the IEN Contracts, as Amended, void.

4.

The District Court Did Not Violate ENA's Rights in Granting Summary
Judgment Against DOA.
a.

Res Judicata Does Not Bar Syringa's Challenge to the Amended ENA
SBPO Because There Was No Previous Lawsuit and Never a Final
Judgment on Syringa's Declaratory Judgment Claim.

Syringa's declaratory judgment action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
because neither the District Court nor this Court entered final judgment on Syringa's declaratory
judgment claim and because Syringa did not file a brand new lawsuit by amending its complaint
post-appeal.
A claim is precluded by res judicata where: "(1) the original action ended in final
judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original action, and
(3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the original
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action." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (Idaho 2012) (citations and
quotation marks omitted); accord Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613,618 (Idaho 2007).
The first element of the test is not met in this case because there was no "original action"
that ended in a final judgment on the merits. See Berkshire lrzvests., LLC, 278 P.3d at 951 ("As
an initial matter, issue and claim preclusion both require that the separate proceedings involve
the same parties or their privies.") (emphasis added); Hindmarsh v. Mock, 57 P.3d 803, 805
(Idaho 2002) ("Res judicata prevents the same plaintiff from bringing multiple lawsuits against
the same defendant for actions arising from the same event.") (emphasis added).
ENA asserts that the "District Court has ruled that the original action against ENA ended
in a final judgment on the merits." (ENA Opening Brief at 21.) The District Court made no
such ruling.

The District Court entered judgment before the appeal dismissing Syringa's

Complaint. Appeal was taken, Syringa I was released on March 29, 2013, which remanded for
"further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." 305 P.3d at 512. After Remittitur
and the filing of Syringa's Motion to Rename Count Three and to Amend Paragraph 94 of its
Complaint, the District Court ruled, contrary to the position argued by Syringa, that ENA was
not a party post-appeal and "must be made a party to this action." (R. p. 1403 (Amendment
Reconsideration Decision).)
ENA suggests (without citing any legal authority) that Syringa commenced a new lawsuit
by amending Count Three of its Complaint. 14 ENA's suggestion is inconsistent with the facts

14 ENA refers to "the original Complaint" and the "original action" when discussing Syringa's pre-appeal
complaint. (ENA Opening Brief at 22-24.)

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC 3438924_8 [5821-112]

61

and not supported by the law because the amendment of a complaint does not commence a new
lawsuit. Rather, "an amended complaint supersedes prior complaints such that all subsequent
pleadings must be based upon the contents of the amended complaint." Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v.
Cnty. of Kootenai, 258 P.3d 340, 346 (Idaho 2011). ENA has not, in other words, been sued in
two separate actions by Syringa and this action is, for purposes of res judicata, still the "original
action."
ENA cited no Idaho cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been applied in the
context of a single lawsuit. Every Idaho case cited by ENA involved two distinct actions and are
inapplicable to this case. See Walters v. Indus. Indem. Co. of Idaho, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (Idaho
1997) (Plaintiffs filed a new declaratory relief action after having their first action dismissed on
appeal, and the second action was barred by resjudicata); Hindmarsh, 57 P.3d at 807 (Plaintiff
first sued Defendant in small claims court and received a judgment, and Plaintiffs second suit
against Defendant in District Court was properly barred by res judicata); Ticor Title Co., 157
P.3d at 617 (title company, who was party to bankruptcy action in which final judgment was
entered, was precluded from bringing later action against the petitioner in the bankruptcy action
concerning property at issue in the bankruptcy); Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 878 P.2d 762,
768-70 (Idaho 1994) (Plaintiffs' action barred by res judicata where Plaintiffs' claims arose out
of same transaction as claims in earlier bankruptcy action to which Plaintiffs were privies);
Berkshire Invests., LLC, 278 P.3d at 951 (subsequent action barred by res Judicata where prior
case ended with final judgment that was affirmed on appeal); Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State,
280 P.3d 679, 685 (Idaho 2012) (applying and interpreting federal claim preclusion law and
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finding subsequent state court action barred by earlier federal agency determination).
ENA urges this Court to apply res judicata on a piecemeal basis by arguing that this
Court's decision in Syringa I affirming the dismissal of Syringa's breach of contract claim
(Count Six of Syringa' s Complaint) was final for purposes of res judicata. (ENA Opening Brief
at 22-23.) The authorities cited in support of this proposition, however, involved distinguishable
situations where a party tried to relitigate a claim whose dismissal was affirmed on appeal. See
Merrimack St. Garage, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 667 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.N.H. 1987); Ernest W
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, No. C-75-2706 RPA, 1981 WL 2191, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1981);
Mazaleski v. Harris, 481 F. Supp. 696,698 (D.D.C. 1979). Even if this Court were to follow the
analysis of the cases selected by ENA, they do not require the application of res judicata as to
Count Three. The dismissal of Count Three was reversed, not affirmed, on appeal. There was
never a final judgment on the declaratory judgment action and that claim was remanded to the
District Court for consistent proceedings.
Finally, a review of the purposes underlying the res judicata doctrine demonstrates why
res judicata is inapplicable under these procedural circumstances:
First, it "[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution
against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results." Second, it
serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the
burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private
interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
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Hindmarsh, 57 P.3d at 805 (citation omitted). In this case the same matter is not being "twice
litigated," and there is no "repetitious litigation" or "harassment" because this is the "original
action" commenced in 2009.
Syringa did not file a new lawsuit post-appeal against ENA, as ENA contends. Instead,
Syringa instituted a lawsuit that was decided, appealed, reversed in part, and remanded.
Following remand, the District Court, in its discretion, and consistent with Syringa I, permitted
Syringa to amend its declaratory judgment claim to challenge DOA's issuance of the Amended
SBPO to ENA. There was no final judgment on the declaratory judgment action against DOA.
Res judicata does not apply under these circumstances.
b.

The District Court Did Not Err in Treating ENA's Motion to Dismiss
as One for Summary Judgment.

After the District Court ruled on the contents of the post-appeal complaint, Syringa filed
its Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, and served it, along
with a Summons, on ENA on July 3, 2014. (See Ex. 4 to McQuade Affidavit.) ENA
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss in which it claimed Syringa was barred by the doctrines
of judicial estoppel and res judicata from asserting Count Three as applied to ENA. (R. pp.
1434-1447.)
The District Court explained that it treated ENA's Motion to Dismiss as an I.R.C.P.
I2(b)(6) motion because the motion was based on the doctrines of res judicata and judicial
estoppel, which are normally pleaded as affirmative defenses. (R. pp. 1644-1645 (Dispositive
Decision).)

The District Court further explained that "[b]ecause the motion involves
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consideration of matters outside the pleadings, the Court will treat the 12(b)( 6) as a motion for
summary judgment as to those affirmative defenses under I.R.C.P. 56." (R. p. 1645 (Dispositive
Decision).) ENA takes issue with this decision.
The Court's decision to convert ENA's motion was not improper. Under I.R.C.P. 12(b):
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

I.R.C.P. 12(b); see McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824, 829 (Idaho 2012) ("Where a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is supported by information
outside of the pleadings, the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment.").
ENA presented matters outside the pleading (Syringa's Second Amended Post-Appeal
Complaint) in its Motion to Dismiss. ENA asserts it "presented a motion to dismiss free of any
disputed facts," but that assertion misconstrues the standard, which focuses on matters outside
the "pleading" being challenged. (ENA Opening Brief at 30.)

ENA cited the following

documents outside the challenged pleading in support of its Motion to Dismiss (the page
citations are examples; certain documents are cited multiple times throughout the brief): (1)
Syringa's original Complaint (R. p. 1438); (2) the District Court's Reconsideration Decision (R.
p. 1438); (3) This Court's Opinion (R. pp. 1438-1439, 1445); (4) Syringa's Second Amended
Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (R. pp. 1440-1441); and (5) Feb. 9, 2011
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment (R. p. 1444).
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ENA also did not constrain its challenge to the facts alleged in Syringa's Second
Amended Post Appeal Complaint, but relied upon decisions from the District Court and this
Court involving facts outside the four comers of the challenged pleading (such as affidavits and
deposition testimony, submitted for the courts' consideration by various parties). (R. pp. 14371447.) Because those decisions were based upon evidence outside the challenged pleading, they
also constituted "matters outside the pleading" under I.R.C.P. 12(b).
ENA's submission and reference to these materials that were outside the challenged
pleadings made the conversion of ENA's Motion to Dismiss appropriate under the
circumstances.
c.

The District Court Did Not Ignore ENA's Motion to Dismiss
Arguments And Properly Ruled that ENA's Arguments to Avoid
Joinder Could Not Prevent a Ruling on the Merits of Count Three.

The District Court did not avoid its duty to address ENA's arguments concerning its
status as a party and properly ruled that ENA's arguments could not overcome the affirmative
duty of the District Court to invalidate illegal contracts and the obvious illegality of the JEN
Contracts, as Amended. (R. pp. 1648-1649 (Dispositive Decision).) The District Court decision
was especially appropriate because Count Three sought declaratory relief that public contracts
issued by DOA violated competitive bidding statutes designed to protect the taxpayer.
None of the cases cited by ENA support the proposition that a party to a public contract
issued in violation of competitive bidding statutes can prevail on procedural defenses that
insulate the unlawful contracts from judicial scrutiny.
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In Chandler v. Hayden, cited by ENA, this Court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment where the trial court did not consider the admissibility of evidence offered in
support of affirmative defenses to the enforcement of a contract between private parties.

had affirmative defenses related to the formation and enforceability of the contract at issue,
including fraud in the inducement and mutual mistake. Id.

This Court ruled that "the District

Court erred by enforcing a contract without first considering whether a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to Chandler's affirmative defenses, which if proven, could invalidate the
Agreement." 215 P.3d at 491. Unlike the non-moving party in Chandler, ENA did not raise any
defenses that addressed the merits of Count Three that could have precluded summary judgment
against DOA.
Similarly, Idaho Power Co. v. State, By and Through Department of Water Resources is
inapplicable. In Idaho Power Company, this Court did not reverse the trial court's decision for
failure to consider affirmative defenses before ruling on the merits; rather, this Court reversed a
ruling related to the affirmative defenses and so ruled that on remand the affirmative defenses
should be considered. 661 P .2d 741, 754 (Idaho 1983) ("Since we have reversed that ruling of
the District Court, the cause must be remanded for consideration of, and findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issues raised by those affirmative defenses alleging the loss of Idaho
Power's water rights at Swan Falls."). These cases might have been applicable if DOA or ENA
had raised an affirmative defense to DOA's IEN procurement process that was ignored by the
District Court, but they are not applicable under the procedural history of this case.
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Additionally, ENA's assertion that the District Court ignored its arguments is misplaced.
In Sirius LC v. Erickson, this Court ruled that the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment on issues not properly before the trial court. 156 P.3d 539, 544 (Idaho 2007). ENA
argues that the reasoning of Sirius LC precludes a trial court from disregarding matters properly
before it. (ENA Opening Brief at 31-32.) In the instant case, the District Court ruled on the
issues presented by Syringa's summary judgment motion. The District Court did not disregard
ENA's arguments but instead determined that ENA's arguments could not insulate DOA's IEN
procurement process from judicial review. That decision was correct because courts have a clear
duty, not a "perceived duty" as ENA suggests, to "raise the issue of illegality, whether pled or
otherwise, at any stage in the litigation." Hyta, 53 P.3d at 341 (quoting Quiring, 944 P.2d at 70102).
Finally, even if the District Court should have addressed ENA's judicial estoppel and res
judicata arguments before the cross motions for summary judgment, the lack of merit to those

arguments renders any such error harmless.
d.

ENA Had Notice and Opportunity to Respond to Syringa's Summary
Judgment Motion and Remained Silent.

ENA argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against ENA
because ENA did not have an opportunity to respond to Syringa's motion, support its converted
motion, or develop a record to show judgment against ENA was improper. (ENA Opening Brief
at 36-52.) The District Court, however, did not enter summary judgment against ENA. The
District Court entered summary judgment against DOA. (R. pp. 2016-2038 (Reconsideration
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Decision and Judgment).) As explained supra with respect to UDJA requirements, ENA was
required to be a party to this action but was not required to be named as a defendant in Count
Three. ENA's argument, therefore, relies on the incorrect premise that the District Court entered
judgment against ENA.
ENA had the opportunity to respond to Syringa's summary judgment motion as a party
whose interests could be affected by the relief sought in Count Three. ENA had appropriate
notice of Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and nothing prevented ENA from
filing an opposition brief or from joining in DOA's opposition, as it did by presenting oral
argument at the hearing on the dispositive motions. (Tr. p. 66, 1. 21

p. 69, I. 6.)

Syringa filed a Notice of Service of Pleadings on ENA and Qwest, verifying that Syringa
served its post-appeal pleadings, including its March 20, 2014 Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, on ENA and Qwest on April 25, 2014. (See Ex. 1 to McQuade Affidavit.) After the
District Court reconsidered its decision on the contents of the post-appeal complaint, Syringa
filed its Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on June 25, 2014,
and served it, along with a Summons, on ENA on July 3, 2014. (Ex. 4 to McQuade Affidavit.)
ENA subsequently filed its Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2014 (R. pp. 1434-1436.)
Syringa filed a Fourth Amended Notice of Hearing on August 22, 2014, re-noticing its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for hearing on October 10, 2014, the date set by the
District Court for a hearing on multiple motions. Syringa's notice was served on all defendants,
including ENA. (See Ex. 5 to McQuade Affidavit.)
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ENA argues that it did not have proper notice of Syringa's motion under I.R.C.P. 56.
(ENA Opening Brief at 37-41.) To the contrary, the record shows that ENA was served with
Syringa's motion, at the latest, by April 25, 2014, almost six months before the October 10, 2014
hearing date. And, ENA was served \.Vith the Second An1endcd Post Appeal Complaint about
three months before the hearing date, and received notice that Syringa's motion was re-noticed
for October 10, 2014 about two months before the hearing date. Neither Rule 56 nor the cases
cited by ENA required Syringa to re-serve the summary judgment motion on ENA after serving
the Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint on ENA.
ENA argues that I.R.C.P. 12(b) provided ENA with additional notice protections. Rule
12(b) provides that if the trial court converts a motion, "all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." LR.C.P. 12(b).
The record contains no indication by ENA concerning what additional materials, if any, ENA
would have submitted in support of the judicial estoppel and res judicata arguments contained in
its Motion to Dismiss. With respect to Syringa's summary judgment motion, ENA was given a
"reasonable opportunity" to present all the arguments it believed it had concerning the legality of
the SBPOs, as Amended, but apparently chose not to file an opposition in the hope it would
prevail on its Motion to Dismiss.
ENA had notice that the District Court decided to hear ENA's motion on the same date as
Syringa's summary judgment motion but made a strategic decision not to file an opposition brief.
Further, although ENA did not file a brief in opposition to Syringa' s motion, counsel for ENA
presented argument in opposition to Syringa's summa.ry judgment motion at the October 10,
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2014 hearing. (Tr. p. 66, L 21

p. 69, 1. 6.) Additionally, ENA could have presented arguments

concerning the legality of the Amended SBPOs in its Motion for Reconsideration, but instead
only previewed the arguments. (R. pp. 1736-1737.)
ENA had notice of Syringa's summary judgment motion months before it was heard and
was never denied the opportunity to be heard. ENA chose not to be heard through briefing, but
presented oral argument. ENA was not denied any protections afforded by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Due Process Clause. See Meyers v. Hansen, 221 P .3d 81, 89 (Idaho 2009)
(procedural due process requires that parties "must be provided with notice and an opportunity to
be heard" (citing Spencer v. Kootenai County, 180 P.3d 487,493 (Idaho 2008))).
The District Court properly entered summary judgment against DOA after giving ENA, a
party interested in the outcome of Count Three, the opportunity to oppose Syringa's summary
judgment motion.

5.

Syring a Did Not Waive its Right to Challenge the Legality of the Amended
SBPOs by Entering into a Contract with Qwest for a Small Portion of IEN
Connectivity Work.

As explained in the Statement of Facts supra, two years after DOA amended the SBPOs
in violation ofldaho Code§§ 67-5718A and 67-5718(2), Syringa entered into a limited Service
Agreement to provide connectivity to Qwest for portions of the IEN that were located in areas
not well served by Qwest.
DOA and Qwest assert that Syringa's agreement to provide "on call" connectivity to
Qwest constitutes a waiver of Syringa's right and standing to enforce Idaho purchasing law by
declaratory judgment. This waiver contention misses the point of Cou..rit Three. The point of
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Count Three and Syringa I is that competition was unlawfully removed from the IEN contracting
process by Amendments No. 1 that made material changes to the scope of work described in the
IEN RFP. The harm to Syringa was the loss of its ability to fairly compete for the scope of work
that was given to Qwest by Amendments No. 1. That harm is neither redressed nor resolved by
the Service Agreement. Further, the Syringa contract with Qwest is not a contract with DOA and
is not a benefit received by Syringa from DOA's unlawful manipulation of the IEN procurement
process.
DOA and Qwest cite inapplicable cases involving waiver that have no bearing on this
case.

See Thomas MD v. Medical Center Physicians, PA, 61 P.3d 557, 563 (Idaho 2002)

(plaintiff-doctor waived his right to contest his termination when he entered into post-termination
agreements and accepted additional compensation as consideration from the employer); Johnson
v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho 1985) (husband and wife plaintiffs in a personal injury action
barred from suit after the plaintiff husband had elected to collect Worker's Compensation
benefits under the Saskatchewan worker's compensation law); Fremont Cty. v. Warner, 63 P.
106, 107 (1900) (party who benefitted from contract could not later assert that contract was ultra
vires); Payette Lakes Protective Ass 'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 189 P.2d 1009, 1016 (1948) (party
estopped from challenging contract after receiving benefits of contract); Moore v. Boise Land &
Orchard Co., 173 P. 117, 117 (1918) (party to contract was estopped from asserting
encumbrances void).
In contrast to the foregoing cases, this case involves the violation of express statutes that
are designed to protect the integrity of the public contracting process and the fiscal health of the
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State of Idaho. The existence of Syringa's limited contract to provide service to Qwest for the
IEN does not change the fact that Syringa and other qualified vendors were unlawfully
foreclosed by the DOA from bidding independently on the connectivity portion of the IEN
project that was directed to Qwest by Amendments No. 1.
6.

The Severability Clause Did Not Supplant Idaho's Procurement Statutes.

Appellants assert that the District Court should have given effect to the severability
clause incorporated into SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and reinstated the original SBPOs. Appellants'
argument relies on common law principles concerning contracts between private parties and
ignores the fundamental distinction that this case involves competitively-bid public contracts.
When the initial IEN legislation was passed in 2008, DOA was given administrative
oversight of the IEN and was specifically directed to "procure telecommunications services and
equipment for the IEN through an open and competitive bidding process." Ch. 260, § 3, 2008
Idaho Sess. Laws 753, 754 (previously codified at LC. § 67-5745D(5)(h)).
This Court explained the significance of Idaho's competitive bidding statutes and
demonstrated their primacy in the public contracting context in J & J Contractors/0. T Davis
Construction, A.J. V v. State. In that case, this Court concluded that a contractor could not
recover in quantum meruit for work performed for a state entity under a contract that was void
because it violated competitive bidding statutes stating, "[t]he principle is well established in this
state that when a governmental contract is void, the contractor may not recover in quantum
meruit."

797 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Idaho 1990).

In the course of its decision, the court also

explained the public policy behind the competitive bidding statutes in the following words:
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It was manifestly the purpose of the legislature, in enacting the
[statutes], to procure competitive bidding for contracts for making
public improvements ... and thereby to safeguard public funds and
prevent favoritism, fraud and extravagance in their expenditure, ....

Id. (quoting Seys/er v. Mowery, 160 P. 262,263 (Idaho 1916)). It then concluded that the public

contracting statutes controlled and that common law principles of quantum meruit did not apply:
This evidences that there is a strong public policy against the
enforcement of governmental contracts that violate competitive
bidding laws. To allow recovery in quantum meruit for work
performed pursuant to governmental contracts that violate
competitive bidding statutes would emasculate this public policy.
Id.

The J & J Contractors court denied equitable relief that might have been available had the

contracts at issue not been public contracts. Id. J & J Contractors demonstrates that Idaho's
competitive bidding statutory scheme controls over common law contract rules and remedies that
apply in transactions between private parties because of the significant public policy concerns
addressed by public contracting statutes.
A similar principle was recognized by this Court in Syringa I when it noted that RFP
language to the effect that "the State reserves the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly or
in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part" would not negate the requirements

of Idaho Code § 67-5718A. 15 Put simply, common law principles cannot and do not change or
undo the public policy expressed in the Idaho's public purchasing statutes.
The severability clause contained in the State of Idaho Standard Contract Terms and

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT SYRINGA NETWORKS, LLC - 74
3438924_8 [5821-112]

Conditions cannot restore the original IEN contracts. There is no way to reconcile Appellants'
argument with the decision in J & J Contractors described above or with the footnote 1
declaration by this Court that language in the IEN RFP could not negate the operation of Idaho
Code§ 67-57i8A. Appellants' argument is not only reflective of bad policy; it contradicts this
Court's decision in this case and is wrong as a matter of law. Boilerplate language cannot
supplant the statutes of the State of Idaho, and DOA cannot write provisions into its contracts to
escape the operation of those mandatory statutes.
Idaho Code § 67-5725 mandates that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, which violate
Idaho Code § 67-5718A and Idaho Code § 67-5718(2), are void.

The competitive bidding

statutes DOA was required to follow govern the procurement process and provide a mandate for
instances where the procurement process is conducted illegally. See Idaho Code, Title 67,
Chapter 57 (entitled "Department of Administration").

DOA is bound by these statutes,

including Idaho Code§ 67-5725.
D.

The District Court Acted Within its Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees to
Syringa as the Prevailing Party.
1.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Deciding that Syringa was
the Prevailing Party.

"Determination of the prevailing parties m a civil action is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court." Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 606 (Idaho 2012) (citations

Syringa I, 305 P .3d at 505 n. l ("The RFP stated: 'All purchases, leases, or contracts which are based on
competitive proposals will be awarded according to the provisions in the Request for Proposal. The State reserves
the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly or in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part.'
(Emphasis added.) This provision would not negate the requirement of Idaho Code section 67-5718A(i) that
awarding a contract to multiple bidders must be to furnish the same or similar property.").
15
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omitted). A district court does not abuse its discretion so long as it (1) perceived the issue as one
of discretion, (2) acted within the outer bounds of its discretion, in accord with applicable legal
principles, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Id. (citation omitted).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Syringa was the prevailing
party in this litigation. The District Court perceived the issue as one of discretion in its April 20,
2015 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For an Award of Costs and
Attorney Fees ("Fee Decision"). (R. pp. 2356.) It correctly applied the relevant legal principles
that it should take an "overall view" of the case, not a claim-by-claim analysis, and compare the
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. (R.
p. 2356 (citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating &

Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 133 (Idaho 2005)).) And, it reached its ultimate conclusion through
an exercise of reason, specifically recognizing that:
[F]rom the overall view, while Syringa lost a number of
preliminary battles, in the end, Syringa won the war that mattered
decisively, after a lengthy and expensive challenge to a state
agency willing and able to devote significant resources defending
its conduct.
Syringa's challenge effectively terminated a
significant and long term State initiative to design and implement
internet connectivity to all schools in Idaho.
(R. p. 2357.) By properly applying the law and by disclosing its reasoning for its decision, the
District Court determined Syringa was the prevailing party by an exercise of reason. See Palmer

v. Spain, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Idaho 2003); Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 88,
95 (Idaho 2001) (the District Court must disclose its reasoning in order for the appellate court to
determine whether this element satisfied).
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The Fee Decision was not only well within the District Court's discretion; it was correct.
Syringa sought two alternate forms of relief: money damages in the event the IEN contracts
remained in effect for the twenty-year period contemplated in the RFP (Augmented R. p. 34), or
a declaratory judgment that the IEN contracts violated the law and were void and permanently
enjoining performance thereunder. (R. p. 1423.) Syringa sought judgment declaring the IEN
Contracts, as Amended, void to break Qwest's publicly-funded monopoly control of school and
state agency broadband services, and to permit Syringa to participate in a lawful, competitive bid
process to provide broadband services to Idaho schools and agencies. Through the lawsuit,
Syringa successfully dismantled Qwest's monopoly, has begun competing for broadband
contracts, and is in a position to compete when another bidding process is begun.
DOA contends that Syringa is not the prevailing party and relies heavily on the 2012 case
of Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, LLC, 294 P.3d 171 (Idaho 2012). (DOA
Opening Brief at 43-45.) The Hobson court upheld the District Court's determination that both
parties prevailed in part where the parties narrowed the claims of the other party and ultimately
settled the case without a determination of liability. 294 P.3d at 177. In reaching that decision,
this Court stated that a court making a prevailing party determination must not just consider
"who succeeded on more individual claims" but must consider "among other things, the extent to
which each party prevailed relative to the 'final judgment or result."' 294 P.3d at 175 (citing
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)).
Despite Robson's admonition that the prevailing party determination is not reduced to a
numbers game wherein each party's winning claims are tallied against the other's winning
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claims, DOA counts the claims on which Syringa did not prevail. (DOA Opening Brief at 46.)
More importantly, Hobson is not the final word of this Court on the determination of who is a
prevailing party. In Advanced Medical Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC, this
Court took the "overall view" approach to determining the prevailing party and held that the
defendant was the prevailing party because it prevailed on the "primary issue" in the litigation,
even though the defendant failed to prove any damages. 303 P.3d 171, 174 (Idaho 2013) ("The
determination of prevailing party is not decided merely by counting the answers on the special
verdict form and holding that whoever received more answers in its favor is the prevailing
party.").
Syringa is the prevailing party because it prevailed on the "primary issue" in this case.
This lawsuit accomplished what Syringa set out to do. As in Idaho Military Historical Society,
Inc. v. Maslen, where the plaintiff was awarded equitable relief but did not succeed on a variety
of secondary issues, here Syringa's claim for equitable relief succeeded, though its secondary
claims did not. 329 P.3d 1072, 1078-79 (Idaho 2014). Moreover, as in Idaho Military Historical
Society, Syringa should never have been forced to file a lawsuit; DOA should have complied
with the law from the outset.

Id. at 1078 ("No lawsuit for possession should have been

necessary."). Furthermore, the Idaho Military Historical Society court looked to the conduct that
"primarily precipitated" the lawsuit in determining the prevailing party. Id. Here, each one of
Syringa's claims, including those on which Syringa did not prevail, was precipitated by the
conduct challenged in Count Three, DOA's unlawful split of the IEN Contracts, as Amended.
All of these factors support the District Court's conclusion that Syringa was the prevailing party
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in this litigation.
DOA argues that the District Court "failed to consider the entire case and the relief
requested," and that it "failed to consider successes in defending against claims."

(DOA

Opening Brief at 46.) This is simply not true. The District Court explicitly acknowledged that
the DOA and other defendants had succeeded on some claims. (R. p. 2357 (Fee Decision) ("The
Court recognizes that Syringa did not prevail on [listing claims].").)

The District Court,

however, correctly recognized that Syringa had prevailed on "most significant claim presented in
this case," the claim to void the IEN Contracts, as Amended. (R. pp. 2356-2357 (Fee Decision).)
The District Court properly determined that Syringa was the prevailing party.
2.

The District Court did not err in awarding fees under Idaho Code § 12120(3).

"Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law over which
this Court exercises free review." Idaho Transp. Dep't v. Ascorp, Inc., 357 P.3d 863, 865 (Idaho
2015). Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) requires an award of fees to a prevailing party when the lawsuit
involves a commercial transaction between the prevailing and non-prevailing parties. I.C. § 12120(3). As this Court has recognized, there need not be a contract between the parties, so long as
a commercial transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. E.g., In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr.
Project, 199 P .3d 102, 116 (Idaho 2008). A commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of the
lawsuit if it is a "material or significant part of' the complaint. Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P .3d 907,
911-12 (Idaho 2015). A commercial transaction is, in tum, a "material or significant part of' a
complaint if it "(1) is integral to the claim and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory of
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recovery on that claim." Id.
A commercial transaction is the gravamen of Syringa's Complaint, and specifically
Count Three. Indeed, DOA championed this point during the first appeal by specifically arguing
it was entitled to fees against Syringa under § 12-120(3). (See State Respondents' Brief and
Cross-Appeal Brief, filed in this Court April 23, 2012 at 49 ("The IDA is entitled to all attorney
fees expended in defense of this litigation under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).").) This Court agreed
that DOA was not precluded from seeking fees under§ 12-120(3). Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 511.
Having first advocated that the case involved a "commercial transaction" between Syringa and
DOA, the DOA cannot now credibly argue otherwise.
In any case, the gravamen of Count Three was a series of commercial transactions to
which DOA was an integral party. The DOA solicited, and eventually awarded, a contract for
the design and operation of the Idaho Education Network that was worth tens of millions of
dollars; Syringa agreed to become ENA's principal subcontractor so ENA could submit a
responsive proposal to DOA; ENA submitted the JEN Alliance proposal, which explicitly relied
upon Syringa's broadband capabilities; DOA accepted the proposal; and DOA unlawfully split
this transaction, denying Syringa the business it expected under the teaming agreement and
preventing Syringa from submitting its own bid for the work that was given to Qwest. These
commercial transactions are integral to, and constitute the basis of recovery on, Count Three.
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the gravamen of Count Three was a
commercial transaction between DOA and Syringa. (R. pp. 2364-2367 (Fee Decision).)
DOA argues that "[n]o commercial transaction was 'integral' to Syringa's claim against
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the DOA under Count III," citing Scott v. Buhl Joint Sch. Dist. No. 412, 852 P.2d 1376 (Idaho
1993). (DOA Opening Brief at 51.) Scott is an outdated case that denied fees under§ 12-120(3)
because the parties did not have a "contractual relationship." 852 P.2d at 1383 ("The Scotts are
not involved in any contractuai reiationship with either Buhl or Mayflower; they are not seeking
relief upon the basis of a contract, but instead on the basis of a competitive bidding statute.").
This rationale for denying fees is no longer good law in light of In re University Place and this
Court's current case law, which does not require a contractual relationship. In re Univ. Place,
P.3d at 116-119; Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007) (holding
that Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) "does not require that there be a contract" and that "[a]ny previous
holdings to the contrary are overruled"). Under the current state of the law, the District Court
correctly concluded that the gravamen of Count Three was a "commercial transaction" within the
meaning ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3).

3.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that DOA's postremand arguments lacked a reasonable basis and awarding fees under Idaho
Code§§ 12-117 and§ 12-121.

The District Court concluded that DOA's continued litigation after this Court's remand
had no reasonable basis in fact or law. (R. pp. 2362-2364 (Fee Decision).) It, therefore, awarded
attorney fees after March 29, 2013 under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and§ 12-121. (R. pp. 23622364, 2367-2369 (Fee Decision).) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this
conclusion.
The District Court also held that DOA's actions violated the law: "Clearly, DOA erred in
dividing the RFP work into separate contracts for dissimilar services. DOA could not make
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Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone. lust as clearly, DOA could not make ENA the
exclusive provider for E-rate services." (R. p. 2030 (Reconsideration Decision).) The unlawful
nature of DOA's actions became abundantly clear after Syringa I, as the District Court
recognized.

(R. pp. 2029-2030 (Reconsideration Decision).)

Regardless, DOA refused to

acknowledge this Court's clear language regarding the contract's illegality.

(R. p. 1650

(Dispositive Decision) ("To date, DOA refuses to acknowledge that its bid process in this case
was and remains fatally flawed. Even after the Supreme Court decision, and despite further
rulings from this Court rejecting DOA's post appeal arguments, DOA continues to fund these
contracts. DOA even tries to fix what cannot be fixed.").) Perhaps most strikingly, DOA has
never offered a substantive justification of the legality of the JEN procurement process. Instead,
DOA expended years and untold quantities of taxpayer dollars arguing that no one, including
Syringa, this Court, or the District Court, had standing or the jurisdiction to identify and remedy
the legal violations that occurred.
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
LC. § 12-117(1) (emphasis added). 16 As the District Court correctly noted, Idaho Code§ 12-117
has two purposes: "(l) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to

16 Idaho Code § 12-117(2) similarly allows attorney fees if a party prevails on a portion of its case and the
non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case.
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provide a remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v.
Latah Cnty., 172 P .3d 1081, 1084 (Idaho 2007) overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v.
Randel, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (Idaho 2012). The DOA acted without basis in law because Idaho
Code§ 67-5718A plainly does not allow DOA to issue split awards and because Idaho Code§
67-5718(2) plainly prohibits DOA from changing the scope of work after the bids are opened.
DOA spent many years and countless dollars arguing that no one could address the illegality of
the IEN contracts, as amended, and even tried to manipulate the process again after Syringa I by
entering into the Rescission Amendments.
The District Court's award of fees squarely vindicates both purposes served by Idaho
Code § 12-117. The award of fees will serve as a deterrent to future unlawful action, and will
provide some relief to Syringa, which has borne a huge financial burden attempting to correct
DOA' s actions.
DOA argues that an award of fees under § 12-117 is precluded because DOA raised an
issue of first impression relating to administrative exhaustion. 17 (DOA Opening Brief at 47-48.)
In making this argument, DOA fails to recognize that the District Court awarded fees under§ 12117 only for the time period after this Court decided that it acted unlawfully under Syringa I.
While Syringa disagrees with DOA's contention that the exhaustion issue was one of first

Certainly, as to Count Three, Syringa is the prevailing party and for the reasons discussed herein, the DOA acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that claim.
17 The principle that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies when there are no remedies to exhaust is
not new. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 207 P.3d 963, 970-971 (2009), cited in Syringa L 305 P.3d at 506, the only
issue of"first impression" concerned whether Idaho Code§ 67-5733 provided a remedy-which it did not.
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impression, the disagreement is irrelevant because DOA did not raise the issue after remand.
Moreover, as described above, in continuing to defend Count Three after remand, the DOA
consistently ignored the clear implications of this Court's ruling. The District Court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the post-remand defense was without a reasonable basis in
fact or law under§ 12-117.
The District Court also awarded fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, which permits fees to
the prevailing party when a court finds that a case was defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation. LC. § 12-121; I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(l). Under Idaho Code§ 12-121, the trial
court must view the case as a whole and apportion fees for those elements of the case that were
defended frivolously. Idaho Military Historical Soc., 329 P.3d at 1080. 18 In accordance with
these legal standards, the District Court recognized that DOA had successfully defended portions
of the case. (R. p. 2368 (Fee Decision).) However, after this Court's decision in Syringa I, the
only claim that remained was Count Three. "Given the Supreme Court's determination that
DOA's awards were unlawful," the District Court correctly concluded that the DOA's defenses
were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. (R. p. 2368 (Fee Decision).)
Finally, DOA argues that the District Court failed to distinguish between work done on
Count Three and work done on other claims. (DOA Opening Brief at 54-55.) Not true. The

18 DOA supports its position concerning Idaho Code§ 12-121 by citation to Philips v. Blazier-Henry, 302
P.3d 349, 356 (Idaho 2013) (following rule set forth in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington
Federal Savings, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (Idaho 2001)). (DOA Opening Brief at 53-54.) The Philips case is inapposite
because it was abrogated by Idaho Military Historical Society. This Court stated: "This Court does back away from
and clarify the overly strict application ofldaho Code section 12-121 set forth in Nampa Meridian. Apportionment
of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without
foundation." 329 P.3d at 1080 (emphasis added). Under the current standard, DOA couid not avoid an adverse fee
award under Idaho Code§ 12-121 by presenting "one legitimate issue" somewhere during the course of the lawsuit.
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District Court explicitly recognized, based on its review of Syringa's materials in support of its
fee request, that Syringa segregated and sought only reasonable fees related to Count Three of
the Complaint. (R. p. 2367 (Fee Decision).) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
doing so.
As to the award of fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, the District Court
recognized that the fee award was discretionary, exercised its discretion in accord with legal
standards, and came to its decision through an exercise of reason. Therefore, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding post-remand fees to Syringa under Idaho Code§§ 12-117
and 12-121. 19
E.

Syringa is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal. ENA is Not.
If Syringa prevails in this appeal, Syringa is entitled to costs and attorney fees under

Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 provides for the award of attorney fees, and Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides
for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. See I.A.R. 40; I.A.R. 41.
DOA's appeal is meritless. The core of DOA's appeal is that the District Court erred by
recognizing and giving effect to this Court's decision in Syringa I. DOA's arguments on appeal
lack reasonable basis in fact and law and are as frivolous as the arguments below. Accordingly,

19 DOA does not dispute or provide briefing upon the District Court's award of supplemental fees and
costs. (See DOA Opening Brief at 43-54; see also R. pp. 2432-2438 (June 20, 2015 Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: Supplemental Judgment for Costs and Attorneys Fees, and Supplemental Judgment).) DOA has,
therefore, waived any challenge to this decision. E.g., Sherman Storage, LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions IL LLC,
2015 WL 6657666, at *7 (Idaho Nov. 2, 2015). In any case, the District Court properly recognized its discretion to
award supplemental fees, identified and applied the correct legal standards, and reached its conclusion through an
exercise of discretion. (See R. pp. 2432-2436.)
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S yringa is entitled to its costs and fees on appeal under Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121 . In
addition, Syringa is entitled to its costs and fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), as the
appeal involves a commercial transaction between Syringa and DOA, as described above.
ENA requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). (ENA Opening
Brief at 52-53.)

ENA is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal for two reasons.

First, as

discussed above, Appellants' arguments are wrong as a matter of law. Accordingly, none of the
Appellants, including ENA, is a prevailing party. Second, ENA has been joined to Count Three
only because it is a necessary or indispensible party to that claim. Syringa does not assert Count
Three against ENA. Consequently, even if this Court were to rule against Syringa on Count
Three, ENA would not be a "prevailing party" on that claim within the meaning of the statute.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the District Court holding that the IEN Contracts, as Amended, are void,
should be affirmed, subject only to the addition of direction to DOA pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 67-5725 that is the subject of Syringa' s cross-appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

9th

day of December, 2015.
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----
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